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REGULATING THE SALE OF STOCK EXCHANGE MARKET
DATA TO HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADERS
Jerry W. Markham*
Abstract
In 2014, author Michael Lewis published a bestselling book titled
Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt, in which he argued that “highfrequency traders” have been able to gain an unfair advantage in the stock
market, in part because stock exchanges and “dark pools”—alternative
venues for trading stocks—have enabled those traders to obtain and trade
on market data faster than other investors. A litany of lawsuits followed
in short succession, asserting various theories of liability.1
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INTRODUCTION
The centerpiece of the enforcement program of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) is its “insider” trading prosecutions.2
Those cases typically involve individuals who trade on material
nonpublic information affecting the price of a publicly traded stock.3 SEC
insider trading claims are based on that agency’s premise that market
integrity and fairness require that all traders have equal access to
information material to the valuation of a publicly traded security.4
Despite the fervor that it has applied to its insider trading enforcement
actions, the SEC has endorsed unequal access to extremely marketsensitive nonpublic information in the form of stock-exchange-generated
“market data.”5 High-frequency and other professional traders (HFTs) are
given preferred access to that data in exchange for lucrative fees charged
by the stock exchanges.6 Market data fees are a “primary” source of
income for those exchanges, providing revenues that totaled $5.4 billion
in 2016.7 “[T]here have been massive increases in fees for market data in
2. See Peter J. Henning, Insider Trading Remains a Fixture for Securities Enforcement,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/01/business/dealbook/insidertrading-enforcement-prosecution.html [https://perma.cc/Q4K2-AZGT] (describing recent high
profile insider trading prosecutions). See generally DAVID A. VISE & STEVE COLL, EAGLE ON THE
STREET (1991) (describing prosecutions for insider trading in the 1980s that became the SEC’s
signature crime).
3. See generally, e.g., WILLIAM K. S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING (3d
ed. 2010) (describing insider trading claims).
4. See Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638, at *4–5
(Nov. 8, 1961) (creating this “equal access” doctrine); see also infra Section IV.A (describing the
SEC’s equal access doctrine and its limitations).
5. As one source notes, “[m]arket data is information about current stock prices, recent
trades, and supply-and-demand levels sold by national securities exchanges.” Market Data,
SIFMA, https://www.sifma.org/explore-issues/market-data/ [https://perma.cc/C7A5-YVE4].
6. Gretchen Morgenson, NYSE, Nasdaq Rival Aims to Shed Light on Fee Profits, WALL
ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/nyse-nasdaq-rival-aims-to-shed-light-on-fee-profits-115487
83330 [https://perma.cc/ZD6Q-EHXF] (last updated Jan. 29, 2019, 9:25 PM).
7. Letter from Melissa MacGregor, Managing Dir. & Assoc. Gen. Counsel, SIFMA, to
Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/11/SIFMA-Comments-on-SEC-NYSE-and-Cboe-Market-Data-Fee-Increases.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YZ9A-PB4C].
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recent years.”8 One survey found that exchange market-data fees
“skyrocketed” between 2010 and 2017, increasing by 1,100% during that
period.9
The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(SIFMA)—the principal securities industry trade organization for
investment banks, stock brokerage firms, and other financial
institutions—has challenged the explosion in market-data-fee charges by
the stock exchanges before the SEC and in the courts.10 Traders
disadvantaged by the unequal access to market data provided by the stock
exchanges to HFTs have also challenged that disparity in the courts on a
number of grounds.11
As SIFMA has asserted, ready access to stock-exchange-generated
market data “is essential to America’s world-leading capital markets
because all participants need timely and complete data to make informed
trading decisions.”12 Market data is an especially critical factor in the
trading strategies of HFTs who are now dominating market volumes.13
8. Market Data, supra note 5.
9. Market Data, PROJECT: INVESTED, http://www.projectinvested.com/market-data/
[https://perma.cc/M6QA-ELJ5].
10. See id.; infra notes 183–86, and accompanying text (describing those challenges).
11. See In re Barclays Liquidity Cross & High Frequency Trading Litig., 126 F. Supp. 3d
342, 347, 353–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated, 878 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017).
12. Market Data, supra note 9; Market Data, supra note 5. Another source also notes that
“[m]arket data is a key part of successful markets, and as an industry we have consistently
maintained that market data must be timely, comprehensive, nondiscriminatory, and accessible to
all market participants at a reasonable cost.” Kenneth Bentsen, The Cost of Investing Is Going
Down, So Why Are Market Data Fees Rising?, REALCLEAR MKTS. (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2019/01/31/the_cost_of_investing_is_going_down
_so_why_are_market_data_fees_rising_103602.html [https://perma.cc/BAX9-VWGL].
13. City of Providence v. BATS Glob. Mkts., Inc., 878 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2017)
(“According to the plaintiffs, HFT firm transactions now account for nearly three-quarters of the
exchanges’ equity trading volume.”), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 341 (2018); see also Hester Peirce,
Meeting Market Structure Challenges Where They Are, 43 J. CORP. L. 335, 349 (2018) (describing
the nature of HFT trading). As one court noted:
Although there is no definitive definition of what constitutes HFT, the term
generally refers to the practice of using computer-driven algorithms to rapidly
move in and out of stock positions, making money by arbitraging small
differences in stock prices—often across different exchanges—rather than by
holding the stocks for an appreciable period of time.
Barclays Liquidity Cross, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 349. The information driving these algorithms
includes pending limit orders that show the depth of the market for a particular stock or
commodity. See generally Jonathan Brogaard et al., Price Discovery Without Trading: Evidence
from Limit Orders, J. FIN. (forthcoming 2019). That information is analyzed by the HFTs’
algorithms, which generate orders to respond to the expected market response to those pending
orders, as where there is an order imbalance in long and short orders. See infra notes 108–09 and
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HFTs are given privileged, advance access to critical market data by the
exchanges in exchange for additional fees.14 This preferred access
provides HFTs with a substantial edge in their trading,15 allowing HFTs
to anticipate, game, and otherwise exploit the nonpublic orders of other
traders.16
The SEC has endorsed this disparity in access to exchange market data
by HFTs,17 which conflicts with the SEC’s concerns in other contexts
regarding the use of unequal access to material nonpublic information,
i.e., “insider trading.”18 The SEC has broadly claimed elsewhere that
accompanying text (describing HFT trading). If the predicted change does not occur the HFT’s
orders are cancelled. Petter Dahlström et al., The Determinants of Limit Order Cancellations,
EUR. FIN. MGMT. ASS’N, June 2017, at 1–2. This whole process is often completed in the merest
fractions of a second. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. The preferred access by HFTs
also includes “co-located” servers that HFTs place near the exchanges’ servers to shave fractions
of a second off order transmission times. See infra notes 113–16 and accompanying text
(describing the advantages of co-location). The exchanges rent space for this service. See infra
note 113.
14. See infra Section I.C (describing that preferred access).
15. See infra Section I.C (describing how HFTs and other professional traders have
supplanted traditional exchange-market makers). There has been much debate over whether the
HFTs, on the one hand, are valuable to the market because they add liquidity and should be
encouraged or whether, on the other hand, they are taking unfair advantage of slower, less
sophisticated traders. See Jerry W. Markham, High-Speed Trading on Stock and Commodity
Markets—From Courier Pigeons to Computers, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 555, 556–57 (2015).
16. As one court observed:
The effects of HFT on the stock market are the subject of some controversy.
Some commentators and, at points, the SEC, have stated that HFT firms have a
positive effect on the market by creating significant amounts of liquidity, thereby
permitting the national stock market to operate more efficiently and benefitting
ordinary investors (including Plaintiffs). Others have sharply criticized the HFT
firms' trading practices. Chief among their criticisms . . . is that the HFT firms
use the speed at which they are capable of trading to identify the trading
strategies being pursued by ordinary investors and react in a manner that forces
ordinary investors to trade at a less advantageous price, with the HFT firm taking
as profit a portion of the “delta”—that is, the difference between the price at
which the ordinary investor would have traded and the price at which it actually
traded as a result of the HFT firm's actions. For that reason, opponents of HFT,
including Plaintiffs, often describe them as “predatory” or “toxic” trading
strategies. More specifically . . . Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have provided
the ingredients necessary for HFT firms to execute their predatory trading
strategies and thereby enabled the HFT firms to exploit ordinary—that is, nonHFT—investors.
Barclays Liquidity Cross, 126 F. Supp. 3d at 350 (citations omitted).
17. See infra notes 164–66 and accompanying text (describing the SEC’s public utility-like
approach to the regulation of these fees).
18. See infra Section IV.A (describing the SEC’s insider trading theory).
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insider trading occurs on stock exchanges whenever a trader trades on the
basis of unequal access to material nonpublic information.19 Engaging in
such activity can, and often does, result in a criminal conviction and jail
time, as well as large civil fines.20 Yet, the privileged access to exchange
market data available to HFTs is allowed and even encouraged by the
SEC.21 It is more disconcerting that the SEC protects the unequal access
of HFTs to this market data by limiting the fees that exchanges may
charge to HFTs for that data, a process that is conducted through publicutility-like rate-setting proceedings.22
There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with HFTs using their
high-speed communication systems to trade ahead of slower traders.23
That phenomenon has been present in the markets since the early days of
stock trading. For example, traders with advance information have beaten
other traders to the market using courier pigeons, smoke signals,
telegraphs, telephones, fiber-optic cables, and, more recently,
19. See Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638, at *3–5
(Nov. 8, 1961) (creating this doctrine); see also infra Part V (discussing unequal access to
information claims).
20. See 5 Surprising Facts About Insider Trading, FINRA (May 3, 2017),
https://www.finra.org/investors/5-surprising-facts-about-insider-trading [https://perma.cc/L4T7PDUG]; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Introduction to RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER
TRADING 1 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 2013) (describing insider trading as the most common
violation of federal securities laws).
21. See infra Section II.A (discussing how the exchanges and the SEC have developed
“maker-taker” arrangements to compensate HFTs for providing liquidity to the markets). As one
author notes, HFT critics:
[A]re concerned that HFT is harmful to retail investors, market quality and
integrity, and market stability. They argue that HFT firms “front-run” the market.
Critics also contend that even HFT’s contribution to the market—the liquidity
HFT provides—is not as good as it seems at first glance; it is less deep, more
transient, and more disruptive than the liquidity offered by more traditional
market makers. Some market observers classify as unfair the methods HFT firms
use—co-locating their computers next to the exchanges’ computers; paying for
expensive private data feeds that are better and faster than the public ones; buying
other potentially market-moving data; placing and cancelling many orders; and
negotiating special order types that flash, hide, and slide.
Peirce, supra note 13, at 348–49 (footnotes omitted); see also City of Providence v. BATS Glob.
Mkts., Inc., 878 F.3d 36, 41–43 (2d Cir. 2017) (describing claims of HFT abuses), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 341 (2018).
22. See Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84,432,
2018 WL 5023228, at *4–6 (Oct. 16, 2018); see also NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525, 527–28
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding the SEC failed to conduct a proper review of such fees), superseded by
statute, Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010), as recognized in NetCoalition v. SEC, 715 F.3d 342 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
23. See Markham, supra note 15, at 557–59 (describing the high-speed communications
HFTs use to trade and provide advantages over other slower traders).
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microwaves.24 That being said, the privileged access to exchange market
data given to HFTs appears to conflict with SEC insider trading doctrines
that criminalize the activities of other traders having unequal access to
material nonpublic information. This privileged access by HFTs also
raises concerns over whether those traders are being allowed to engage in
illegal “front running.” That practice is a subset of insider trading
doctrines, i.e., front running involves accessing the confidential trading
plans of other traders and then trading in front or ahead of those customer
orders.25
In 2014, a bestselling book exposed to the public the inequity in the
access to exchange data by the HFTs.26 That revelation resulted in much
litigation over the unfairness of giving HFTs this information
advantage.27 Unfortunately, those cases have provided little guidance on
the policy concerns raised by this disparate access to information or even
its legality. The purpose of this Article is to address those issues. This
Article will describe the nonpublic market data that the exchanges are
selling to HFTs and other professional traders on a preferential basis. This
Article will demonstrate that while this privileged access is inconsistent
with the theoretical foundation for the SEC’s insider trading programs,
market data has historically been treated as a proprietary product of the
exchanges. That is, the government has allowed the exchanges to sell that
information on a selective basis in the same manner as other
commodities.
Further, this Article contends that there is nothing inherently wrong
with the sale of exchange data and that such data should not be treated as
inside information. This Article supports this thesis through a
comparative analysis of how insider trading is treated under the
24. See id. (describing how those historical communications advances were used by traders
to gain advantage).
25. “Front-running is the practice in which a ‘broker execut[es] orders on a security for its
own account while taking advantage of advance knowledge of pending orders from its
customers.’” Dichter-Mad Family Partners, LLP v. United States, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1021 n.5
(C.D. Cal. 2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Complaint at 22, Dichter-Mad Family Partners,
LLP v. United States, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 2:09-cv-09061-SVW-FMO)),
aff’d, 709 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). For example, the Justice Department brought
criminal charges against individuals who disclosed the large orders of their brokerage firm
customers to other traders who then traded in advance of those orders and profited from their
market effect. See United States v. Mahaffy, 477 F. Supp. 2d 560, 563–64 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
(describing the referenced scheme), aff’d in part and vacated in part, United States v. Mahaffy,
285 F. App’x 797 (2d Cir. 2008).
26. See generally MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014)
(explaining the unfairness of the practice of high-frequency trading).
27. See, e.g., In re Barclays Liquidity Cross & High Frequency Trading Litig., 126 F. Supp.
3d 342, 347–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated, 878 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017).
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Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA).28 That statute applies to
commodity futures exchanges, where HFTs also dominate trading and
have privileged access to exchange market data.29 The CEA rejects the
SEC’s insider trading prohibitions when applied to commodity markets.30
Instead, the CEA follows the common law doctrine that rejects the use of
material nonpublic information in commodity transactions.31 That
approach, which does not require disclosure before trading, has been in
place for over two centuries and has worked well.32
The adoption of this common law approach would relieve the SEC of
its existing role of public-utility-like regulation of exchange market data
fees. Instead, exchange charges for market data would be subjected to the
antitrust laws. Those statutes are used to regulate monopolistic practices
in other markets for fees charged for information or other commoditylike services. This Article will also address other market integrity issues
associated with the privileged access of HFTs to exchange market data.
This includes claims that the privileged access by HFTs to exchange
market data constitutes “front running” or “misappropriation” of the
trading information of other traders.
I. EXCHANGE DATA AS A PROPRIETARY ASSET—SOME HISTORY
A. Stock Markets Become Data Centers
The market data sold to the HFTs by the stock exchanges has
historically been treated as a proprietary product that the exchanges own
and may provide to select traders on a preferred basis.33 Indeed, the
central thesis of exchange trading from its inception in the United States
was limiting access to market data and trading executions to a select
group of exchange members. For example, in the 1792 Buttonwood
Agreement, which was the genesis of the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE), the signers agreed that they would deal only in stocks among
themselves and would “give a preference to each other in our

28. Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27(f) (2012)).
The CEA prohibits restrictions on trading on nonpublic information that may affect commodity
futures prices, even if that information may have a market effect. See id. §§ 6b(b), 9(1); see also
infra Part III (describing the commodity future exchanges which are regulated under the CEA).
29. See infra Part III.
30. See infra Section IV.A (describing the common law approach); see also infra Section
IV.C (describing the commodities markets’ rejection of insider trading prohibitions).
31. See infra Section IV.A (describing the common law approach); see also infra Section
IV.C (describing the commodities markets’ rejection of insider trading prohibitions).
32. See infra notes 213–14 and accompanying text (describing this common law approach).
33. See infra Section I.B.
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Negotiations.”34 The NYSE limited the number of its members and
denied or restricted access to its trading room, where information on stock
values was shared with members only.35 For example, shortly after its
formal creation in 1817, the NYSE prohibited its members from
informing nonmembers of prices for stocks traded in the exchange’s
trading room.36 That information was valuable for traders seeking to
anticipate stock price movements, but its dissemination was limited to
NYSE members.
The NYSE’s secretive trading practices were not a sine qua non for
the trading of stocks. In contrast to the NYSE’s exclusive access to
members only, a freely accessible over-the-counter (OTC) market
developed in speculative stocks not listed on the NYSE.37 That market
was called the “curb” market, because it operated in the streets of New
York.38 It had no official membership and was accessible to anyone who
had the wherewithal to participate.39 It was an open market in which bid
and ask quotations were shouted out in the street.40 Messengers
transmitted those quotes through written messages or by hand signals to
broker offices, where brokers could use that information to formulate
trading decisions.41
NYSE members were prohibited from trading NYSE-listed stocks in
the curb market, but they could trade unlisted securities.42 Curb market
traders that were not NYSE members were barred from access to NYSE
trading data.43 The curb traders resorted to some desperate measures to
gain access to that information. In 1837, the NYSE discovered that some
nonmember traders had drilled a hole through a brick wall at the NYSE
building that allowed them to overhear surreptitiously NYSE trading
34. See Olivia B. Waxman, How a Financial Panic Helped Launch the New York Stock
Exchange, TIME (May 17, 2017), http://time.com/4777959/buttonwood-agreement-stockexchange/ [https://perma.cc/MV62-48HT] (describing the Buttonwood Agreement and its
background).
35. See I JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM
CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492-1900), at 159 (2002) (“The
NYSE . . . barr[ed] public access to its trading sessions.”).
36. Id. at 124; see JEAN STROUSE, MORGAN: AMERICAN FINANCIER 70 (1999).
37. Ann Daly, “The New York Curb Market. . . Which Has No Organization Whatever”:
The Enclosure of New York’s Last Outdoor Stock Market, 1900-1921, GOTHAM CTR. FOR N.Y.C.
HIST. (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.gothamcenter.org/blog/the-new-york-curb-market-which-hasno-organization-whatever-the-enclosure-of-new-yorks-last-outdoor-stock-market-1900-1921
[https://perma.cc/4MHM-297J].
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. I MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 159.
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activity.44 During the Civil War, NYSE did relent somewhat on
nonmember access to its market data. Nonmembers were allowed to
listen to trading on NYSE “through a keyhole for [a fee of] $100.”45 After
the war, spectators were also allowed to watch trading from the gallery
of the new NYSE floor located on Broad Street for a fee of only $50.46
This set a precedent for selectively providing access to exchange market
data for a fee.
The stock market also early on witnessed the development of
advanced communications systems that gave some traders an information
edge in the acquisition of market data. For example, the creation of the
telegraph in the mid-nineteenth century facilitated the reporting of stock
market transactions throughout the country.47 The telegraph allowed
traders to quickly transmit orders from remote locations, favoring traders
with direct telegraph access to the exchanges.48 The telegraph also
opened a lucrative market for exchanges to sell trading data to broker
offices around the country.49 In 1890, the NYSE created the New York
Quotation Company to handle the distribution of its trading data.50
The stock “ticker,” another advanced communications device, further
facilitated the development of the market for exchange data. The stock
ticker allowed the exchange to transmit last sales reports off the exchange
floor and displayed in brokers’ offices around the country.51 By the
1930s, some 9,000 ticker tape machines were displaying NYSE trading
data in brokerage firm offices.52 NYSE was also providing special access
by members trading off the floor to market data through direct telephone
lines53 and “through a bank of telephone operators.”54

44. Bob Pisani, Plundered by Harpies, An Early History of High-Speed Trading, FIN. HIST.,
Fall 2014, at 2.
45. I MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 242.
46. Id. at 250.
47. See Pisani, supra note 44, at 22–23.
48. Id. The telegraph contributed to the consolidation of stock trading because most of the
250 or so exchanges operating in the nineteenth century became redundant and were closed. I
MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 334.
49. See Pisani, supra note 44, at 23.
50. See Kenneth Silber, The Ticker’s Rise and Fall, THINKADVISOR (Feb. 1, 2009, 2:00
AM), https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2008/02/01/the-tickers-rise-and-fall/?slreturn=2018110411
1948 [https://perma.cc/FWV9-PBRT].
51. See Pisani, supra note 44, at 23.
52. II JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM J.P.
MORGAN TO THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (1900–1970), at 226 (2002).
53. I MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 301.
54. II MARKHAM, supra note 52, at 149.
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B. Exchange Market Data Is Deemed Proprietary
Like the stock exchanges, trading in commodities on the Board of
Trade of the City of Chicago (CBOT) and other commodity exchanges
generated valuable market data for traders. This data became a highly
marketable commodity, and the CBOT contracted with the Western
Union telegraph company to provide data from its trading floor to
subscribers throughout the country.55 The CBOT used its control over this
trading data to fend off competitive threats from “bucket shop”
operators.56 Bucket shops were simply gambling operations that used
CBOT market data being disseminated through Western Union to price
their betting activities.57 Late in the nineteenth century, the CBOT sought
to stop that practice by asking the courts to enjoin the bucket shop
operators from accessing its Western Union market data through other
subscribers.58 This touched off a fight in state and federal courts through
litigation in which the Consolidated Stock Exchange, the Gold and Stock
Telegraph Company, and the Commercial Telegram Company claimed
that exchange market data was a matter of public interest and not
exchange property.59
After several setbacks in the lower courts,60 the Supreme Court in
1905 upheld the right of an exchange to protect its proprietary market
data from use by the bucket shops and other unauthorized persons.61 That
ruling set a strong precedent for the proprietary treatment of such
information as a commodity that could be selectively sold to preferred
market participants. The Court stated that “the plaintiff's collection of
quotations is entitled to the protection of the law. It stands like a trade
55. I MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 319.
56. Id. The NYSE was also the target of bucket shops. In 1905 there were some sixty bucket
shop operators in Pittsburgh alone that were using NYSE trading information as the basis for
betting schemes. II MARKHAM, supra note 52, at 6.
57. The Supreme Court defined a “bucket shop” as: “[A]n establishment, nominally for the
transaction of a stock exchange business, or business of similar character, but really for the
registration of bets, or wagers, usually for small accounts, on the rise or fall of the prices of stocks,
grain, oil, etc. . . . .” Gatewood v. North Carolina, 203 U.S. 531, 536 (1906) (quoting State v.
McGinnis, 138 N.C. 724 (1905)). Unlike legitimate brokers, the bucket shops did not transmit
customer orders for execution on the exchanges. Instead, they played a game of “Heads I win,
Tails you lose.” See I MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 318. That is, if the market turned against the
customer, the bucket shop kept the customers’ monies and if adverse to the bucket shop, it would
simply close and move its operations to a new location. Brendan Sapien, Note, Financial Weapons
of Mass Destruction: From Bucket Shops to Credit Default Swaps, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 411,
416 (2010).
58. I MARKHAM, supra note 35, at 319.
59. See J. Harold Mulherin et al., Prices Are Property: The Organization of Financial
Exchanges from a Transaction Cost Perspective, 34 J.L. & ECON. 591, 606, 610–12 (1991).
60. See, e.g., id. at 621–23.
61. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250–51 (1905).
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secret. The plaintiff has the right to keep the work which it has done, or
paid for doing, to itself.”62
C. Stock Exchange Floor Traders and “Specialists”
Exchange trading data was also available on an even more privileged
basis to traders operating on the floors of the stock exchanges.63 Those
exchange members were given a time and place advantage over other
traders.64 This is because stock quotations and last-sale reports were
disclosed on the floor in advance of their transmission to other traders by
telegraph or publication in newspapers.65 That time and place advantage
meant that floor traders trading for their own accounts could respond to
current, real-time market data before off-exchange traders received that
information. This provided a tremendous trading advantage to the floor
traders.66 The cost of that access was the requirement that the floor traders
purchase an often very expensive membership on the exchange and pay
membership fees.67
The SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of 193468 regulated the
time and place advantage of stock exchange floor members.69 In the
1960s, the SEC effectively eliminated the role of traders in trading
opportunistically for their own accounts on exchange floors.70
Nevertheless, “specialists” trading on their floors were allowed to retain
their time and place advantage.71 These specialists were required to pay
for that advantage by accepting an obligation to make a “continuous,”
two-sided “fair and orderly” market.72 The SEC and the stock exchanges
contended that those obligations justified the time and place advantage of
the specialists, i.e., they provided a valuable service to off-exchange
62. Id. at 250.
63. See Markham, supra note 15, at 578.
64. See id. (describing the time and place advantage and its importance to traders).
65. Id. at 578–79.
66. Id. at 578.
67. See id. at 577–78.
68. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq
(2012)).
69. See id. § 78b(3) (recognizing necessary regulation because of the
“markets . . . susceptibility to manipulation and control”).
70. II MARKHAM, supra note 52, at 333–34.
71. See In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007) (explaining the
advantages and powers of a specialist firm).
72. The requirement of a “continuous” market meant that the specialist had to stand ready
to buy and sell the stocks in which it specialized throughout the trading day. See id. A “fair and
orderly” market meant that the specialist was supposed to act as a stabilizing force in the market
by buying stocks for its own account in a declining market and selling stock in a rising market.
See id. at 92 n.2 (offering an example that demonstrates this).
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traders and investors in the form of market liquidity.73 That liquidity
allowed traders and investors to quickly and efficiently enter and exit the
market.
In addition to their time and place advantage, the exchanges gave
specialists access to valuable nonpublic information by allowing them to
maintain the “book” of pending customer “limit” orders.74 The order book
provides information on the depth of the market:
Depth-of-book data includes the best bids and offers
available on an exchange, as well as limit order information
in an exchange’s order book at inferior prices. Among other
uses, this data provides pricing information that can inform
traders how best to place trades that are larger than the
quantities available at the best bid and offer.75
This market data allowed the specialist to forecast market direction
and depth and to respond to market events in advance of other traders.76
Off-floor electronic traders, including HFTs, have now largely
supplanted the specialist function; exchanges have given HFTs
preferential access to the electronic depth-of-order book in return for
large fees.77
D. Commodity Futures Exchange Floor Traders
The CEA did not impose any restrictions on floor traders comparable
to those adopted by the SEC under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Floor traders on the commodity exchanges were not subject to any

73. See Nicholas Wolfson & Thomas A. Russo, The Stock Exchange Specialist: An
Economic and Legal Analysis, 1970 DUKE L.J. 707, 741 (1970).
74. See Mark Borrelli, Market Making in the Electronic Age, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 815, 823–
24 (2001). A limit order is one “in which the customer specifies a minimum sale price or
maximum purchase price, as contrasted with a market order, which implies that the order should
be filled as soon as possible at the market price.” CFTC Glossary, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES
T RADING C OMMISSION, http://www.cftc.gov/ConsumerProtection/EducationCenter/CFTC
Glossary/index.htm#L [https://perma.cc/6VPT-TNGJ].
75. Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84,432, 2018
WL 5023228, at *2 (Oct. 16, 2018).
76. See Borrelli, supra note 74, at 896. Before electronic trading, order books displays were
not available because such information was maintained privately by specialists, floor traders, and
floor brokers. See II MARKHAM, supra note 52, at 125. The information then available was
generally limited to current “bid” and “ask” quotes reported from the floor by voice
communications. See id.
77. See Jerry W. Markham & Daniel J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of
Exchange Trading Floors and the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865, 866, 897–98 (2008);
Markham, supra note 15, at 599–600.
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market-making obligations.78 Rather, those floor traders were allowed to
trade opportunistically with the time and place advantage that their
location on exchange floors provided them.79 There was also no official
specialist function on the commodity futures exchanges.80 Instead, floor
traders competed with each other on what were perceived as equal terms.
Nevertheless, their time and place advantage allowed floor traders to act
on market information before off-floor traders could respond.81 Floor
traders also had advance access to quotes by other floor traders and could
react more quickly to that information than off-floor traders.82 Like the
stock exchange specialists, floor traders have been largely replaced by
HFTs and other electronic, off-exchange traders.83
II. THE SEC’S NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM
A. The SEC Creates a Centralized Market System for Stocks
The computer age for data creation and management slowly trickled
into the securities markets in the 1960s. “The NYSE [instituted] an
automated quotation system in 1965 [for its stocks] that allowed brokers
to obtain quotes from ‘talking’ computers.”84 This was an improvement
from manual transmission of such information, but it was still a delayed
process that favored the specialists and members accessing the data.
The OTC market was also ripe for computerization. Quotes for OTC
stocks were historically published manually through a news service
provided by the National Quotation Bureau.85 Those publications were
78. See II MARKHAM, supra note 52, at 223.
79. See Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices—The
Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281, 363, 367 (l99l) (advocating SEC-style fair and
orderly floor trading requirements to prevent abuses on the floors of the commodity futures
exchanges).
80. See Jerry W. Markham, The Commodity Exchange Monopoly—Reform is Needed, 48
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 977, 1017 n.160 (1991).
81. See id. at 978.
82. See Jerry W. Markham, Prohibited Floor Trading Activities Under the Commodity
Exchange Act, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 36 (1989); Markham, supra note 80, at 978, 1022
(describing the time and place advantage of commodity exchange floor traders). The commodity
exchange floor traders were required to register with the CFTC and were subject to CFTC
regulation. 7 U.S.C. § 6(e) (2012). That regulation was loose and ineffective. See Markham,
supra, at 4–5 (describing abuses of the time and place advantage by commodity exchange floor
traders).
83. See Markham, supra note 15, at 599.
84. II MARKHAM, supra note 52, at 345.
85. See Nick K. Liqudis, What Does It Mean When a Stock Trades on the Pink Sheets or
the OTCBB?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/what-does-it-meanwhen-stock-trades-pink-sheets-or-otcbb/ [https://perma.cc/8PUW-ARZ7]; see also II MARKHAM,
supra note 52, at 347 ("The wholesale or ‘inside’ quotations for over-the-counter securities were

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 3

1222

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

popularly referred to as the “Pink Sheets” because of the color of their
newsprint.86 The dissemination of this publication was delayed by the
printing and manual distribution requirements. The SEC suggested in its
1963 “Special Study of the Securities Markets” that computers, albeit still
in their infancy, could be used to more efficiently and quickly report price
quotes in OTC stocks.87 That observation was followed by the creation
of Nasdaq in 1968.88 Nasdaq introduced an innovative electronic trading
system that displayed quotations of OTC stocks through computer
terminals made available to brokers and professional traders.89 Quote
vendors began appearing and introducing desktop monitors into brokers’
offices, which supplied continuously updated price data on actively
traded stocks.90
The early appearance of computers on Wall Street did not prevent a
near collapse of NYSE at the end of the 1960s. That event was the result
of the inability of brokerage firms to handle the paperwork generated by
an unexpected increase in trading volumes.91 Several NYSE firms failed
during that crisis.92 This led the SEC to consider a complete revamping
of the nation’s stock markets. The result was that, in 1973, the SEC
announced its intent to create a “Central Market System,”93 “la[ying] the
groundwork” for the creation of the “National Market System” (NMS)
for the trading of public stocks.94
The SEC’s plan for the NMS was to create a market involving “a
system of communications by which the various elements of the
marketplace, be the exchanges or OTC markets, are tied together.”95 The
published by the National Quotation Bureau, which was controlled by Commerce Clearinghouse.
The daily, hard-print quotations of dealers were printed in the ‘pink sheets.’”).
86. Liqudis, supra note 85.
87. See SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, pt. 2, at 12 (1963) (“To mention only one more
development, recent improvements in communications and data processing have had notable
effects on the mechanics of doing business and the allocation of business, and there are strong
indications that the full potential of these developments has not yet been realized.”).
88. II MARKHAM, supra note 52, at 347.
89. See id.; Our Heritage: The Evolution of Nasdaq, NASDAQ, https://business.nasdaq.
com/discover/nasdaq-story/our-heritage/index.html [https://perma.cc/MW2R-SH4P].
90. See II MARKHAM, supra note 52, at 347.
91. SEC, STUDY OF UNSAFE AND UNSOUND PRACTICES OF BROKERS AND DEALERS, H.R.
DOC. NO. 92-231, at 13 (1971) (describing the 1967 paperwork crisis).
92. Id. at 27.
93. SEC, SEC POLICY STATEMENT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CENTRAL MARKET SYSTEM 11–12
(1973). The SEC also evidenced this intent earlier in 1971. See Markham, supra note 15, at 601
n.283.
94. See Markham, supra note 15, at 601 & n.283
95. SEC, STATEMENT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE
STRUCTURE OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS 8 (1972).
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NMS envisioned by the SEC sought to create “offices and on exchange
floors, linked together by an electronic communications network (ECN)
and subject to a common regulatory framework.”96 The SEC sought a
centralized market structure that would assure customers of the “best
execution” price for a security wherever it was traded.97
The SEC implemented the NMS in stages that took place over a period
of several decades. The Securities Industry Automation Corporation
(SIAC) was created in 1973 to promote automation and consolidation of
trading in the stock exchanges.98 SIAC acted as the central trade price
reporter for the Consolidated Tape Association (CTA).99 The CTA was
created to consolidate the reporting of last-price sale reports on all stock
exchanges through a composite tape.100 The composite tape contained an
“A” tape for NYSE stocks, a “B” tape for other exchange-listed stocks,
and a “C” tape for NASDAQ-listed securities.101
Congress enacted legislation in 1975 that endorsed the SEC’s NMS
plan.102 However, it took several decades for the SEC to adopt its present
Regulation NMS, which comprehensively dictates the elements of the
national market.103 In the meantime, the doctrine of unexpected
consequences intervened. Electronic trading platforms were transforming
equity and commodity futures markets from floor-driven, open-outcry
operations into computerized trading conducted by traders operating off
96. SEC, supra note 93, at 12.
97. See Best Execution, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/answersbestexhtm.html [https://perma.cc/AWR9-WXH4] (last modified May 9, 2011).
98. See Securities Industry Automation Corporation, N.Y. INST. FIN., https://www.nyif.
com/dictionary/s/term/securitiesindustryautomationcorporation [https://perma.cc/T62X-PMXE].
99. See Joel Hasbrouck et al., New York Stock Exchange Systems and Trading Procedures
7 (N.Y. Stock Exch., Working Paper No. 93-01, 1993); Securities Industry Automation
Corporation, supra note 98.
100. See Hasbrouck et al., supra note 99, at 7; Overview, CONSOLIDATED TAPE ASS’N,
https://www.ctaplan.com/index [https://perma.cc/A3K5-D2EB].
101. U.S. Consolidated Tape Data, UTP PLAN, http://www.utpplan.com/DOC/Q110037%20Sip%20Stats%20Sheet_0114c.pdf [https://perma.cc/BW8X-SLAG]. The Chicago
Board Options Exchange (CBOE) introduced exchange-traded stock options in 1973 and other
exchanges soon followed suit. Morris Mendelson, Exchange Traded Options and the Supply of
Capital, 2 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 65, 65 (1979). The SEC conditioned the expansion of
options trading on a requirement for centralized trade clearing, which was carried out by the
Options Clearing Corporation (OCC). Options Clearing Corporation (OCC), INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/occ.asp [https://perma.cc/854S-R8DU] (last updated May
31, 2018). The exchanges also agreed to the creation of the Options Price Reporting Authority
(OPRA) that publicly reported last sale option transactions on all options exchanges. See Notice
of Receipt of Plan Filed Pursuant to Section 11A(a)(3)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
Exchange Act Release No. 16,519, 1980 WL 29398 (Jan. 22, 1980).
102. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97.
103. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.600–.613 (2018).
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the floor.104 Those electronic platforms removed the time and place
advantage of the specialists and other classical market makers, including
floor traders on the commodity futures exchanges.105
The HFTs trading on electronic platforms supplanted the specialists
and floor traders as market makers. As a result of these and other
pressures, the stock and commodity exchanges transformed themselves
from organizations mutually owned by their members into public
companies owned by shareholders, which needed new revenue sources to
replace membership and other fees generated by the now-obsolete floor
trading operations.106 Market data fees charged to HFTs helped fill that
void.107
The HFTs accomplished this coup partly through the use of
immediate, real-time access to sensitive market information that was once
available only to specialists and floor traders.108 That information was
then exploited by the HFTs’ proprietary algorithmic trading programs,
which generate and execute orders within fractions of a second.109 HFTs
determined their algorithms on the basis of a number of factors, including
probability analysis of the trading and pending or anticipated orders of
104. See generally Markham & Harty, supra note 77 (describing the implementation of new
technology and its effects on the securities markets). The non-exchange electronic trading
platforms were regulated by the SEC separately from the exchanges under Regulation ATS. See
17 C.F.R. §§ 242.300–.304.
105. See generally Markham & Harty, supra note 77 (explaining the effects of
computerization on the futures industry).
106. Reena Aggarwal, Demutualization and Corporate Governance of Stock Exchanges, 15
J. APP. CORP. FIN. 105, 106–07 (2002) (citing increased competition from ECNs as one major
factor driving exchanges to demutualize).
107. See id. at 105.
108. See Richard Finger, High Frequency Trading: Is it a Dark Force Against Ordinary
Human Traders and Investors?, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2018, 8:41 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/richardfinger/2013/09/30/high-frequency-trading-is-it-a-dark-force-against-ordinaryhuman-traders-and-investors/#6d7870676352 [https://perma.cc/SP72-GW77]. As the SEC
observed, “[u]nlike years ago, trades today are transacted in milliseconds or faster and dispersed
among many trading centers. These changes have allowed large market participants to employ
sophisticated trading methods to trade electronically on multiple venues in huge volumes at very
fast speeds.” SEC Adopts Large Trader Reporting Regime, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(July 26, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-154.htm [http://perma.cc/Y2N6DPEY].
109. See Karl Flinders, The Evolution of Stock Market Technology, COMPUTER WKLY. (Nov.
2, 2007, 2:59 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/Articles/2007/11/02/227883/the-evolutionof-stock-market-technology.htm [https://perma.cc/K4T6-PAHJ]. “[A] single algorithm can
submit hundreds of orders per second . . . .” Concept Release on Risk Controls and System
Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,542, 56,546 (proposed Sept.
12, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. ch. 1). Computerized artificial intelligence is taking highfrequency trading to new levels. See Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the
Failure of Intent and Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 889, 909 (2018).
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other traders.110 That information was in the exchanges’ depth-of-orders
books, which the exchanges provided to HFTs in return for lucrative
fees.111 This access undercut the role of the specialists who once
controlled access to that data.112 HFTs obtained another time and place
advantage through the “co-location” of their computer servers they
placed at specially built exchange facilities, for which the exchanges
charged more fees.113
In this new trading environment, computerized trading platforms
provided electronic order-matching services that proved an efficient
alternative to floor trading by open outcry. Among other things,
electronic trading helped reduce the effects of “slippage” and
“latency.”114 “Slippage” is a reference to “the potential change in the
price of an investment between the time an order is contemplated,
entered, and executed.”115 “Latency” is a reference to the delays in order
entry and execution that increase the risk of slippage, i.e., the longer the
execution time, the greater the likelihood of an adverse price movement
or loss of a trading opportunity.116
In the days of exchange floor trading, latency and slippage placed offfloor traders at a severe disadvantage, while providing specialists and
floor traders with a decided edge over those traders. Electronic trading
removed the time and place advantages of specialists and floor traders.
Their low latency access also “enables HFT firms to access stock prices
a split second before the rest of the investing public.”117
110. See Finger, supra note 108 (describing how these algorithms work and their strategic
advantages over traditional traders).
111. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING: BACKGROUND, CONCERNS,
AND REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS 35 (2014).
112. See Markham, supra note 15, at 559–60.
113. As was observed in Congress: “Another key tactic used by high-frequency trading firms
is co-location. This practice involves trading firms literally renting space for their computers in
the same room as the computers that run the stock exchanges so that they can receive market
information directly from the exchanges’ computers as fast as possible.” Conflicts of Interest,
Investor Loss of Confidence, and High Speed Trading in U.S. Stock Markets: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th
Cong. 5 (2014) (statement of Sen. McCain, Member, Subcomm. on Homeland Sec. &
Governmental Affairs).
114. See Markham, supra note 15, at 560–61.
115. Id.; see also Goldstein v. Mortenson, 113 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (“The
time expended in placing phone calls allowed market positions . . . to change, often resulting in
serious losses . . . . The negative effect resulting from such a delay is known in the industry as
‘slippage.’”).
116. See Markham, supra note 15, at 560–61.
117. Elvis Picardo, You’d Better Know Your High-Frequency Trading Terminology,
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/articles/active-trading/042414/youd-better-knowyour-highfrequency-trading-terminology.asp [https://perma.cc/E5ZJ-8AT2] (last updated Feb.
13, 2018). The Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has noted that:
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The HFTs’ efforts to reduce latency had remarkable success. “Public
data from one exchange group, for example, indicates that roundtrip trade
times on its trading platform fell from 127 milliseconds in 2004 to 4.2
milliseconds in 2011.”118 A millisecond is one thousandth of a second.
“Another exchange group reported in 2010 that its average blended
transaction time in futures and OTC markets was 1.25 milliseconds.”119
Electronic trading has advantages beyond the reduction of risk from
latency and slippage. Among other things, customer orders can be
matched against each other without a specialist or floor trader taking the
“spread.”120 However, the loss of the specialists and floor traders poses a

In response to the emphasis on speed by trading firms, [exchanges] have adopted
highly automated trading systems that can offer extremely high-speed order entry
and execution. In addition, to further reduce latency in transmitting market data
and order messages, many trading markets offer co-location and/or proximity
hosting services that enable market participants to place their servers in close
proximity to the trading market’s matching engine. Accordingly, the growth of
co-location and/or proximity hosting services is largely related to the
development of high frequency trading in the futures and option markets.
Co-Location/Proximity Hosting Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 33,198, 33,199 (proposed June 11, 2010)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 36–38). As was observed in a Congressional hearing: “Another
key tactic used by high-frequency trading firms is co-location. This practice involves trading firms
literally renting space for their computers in the same room as the computers that run the stock
exchanges so that they can receive market information directly from the exchanges’ computers as
fast as possible.” Conflicts of Interest, Investor Loss of Confidence, and High Speed Trading in
U.S. Stock Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Homeland
Sec. & Governmental Affairs, supra note 113; see also Definition of Co-location, FIN. TIMES,
http://lexicon.ft.com/TERM?TERM=CO_LOCATION [https://perma.cc/RA8G-6N2W] (“‘[C]olocation’ shaves crucial milliseconds from the time it takes to complete a trade.”).
118. Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,542, 56,546 (proposed Sept. 12, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
ch. 1).
119. Id. In 2014, one exchange determined that “11% of all 2014 observable orders lasted
less than one millisecond.” How Fast is High-Frequency Trading? Faster Than You Think,
EQUEDIA (May 3, 2015), http://www.equedia.com/how-fast-is-high-frequency-trading/
[https://perma.cc/3XEL-USP6]. “In today’s electronic financial markets, a single investor can
execute more than 10,000 trades a second, meaning more than 1,000 trades can happen in the
blink of an eye.” High-Frequency Traders Need a Speed Limit, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Jan. 25,
2015, 5:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2015-01-25/high-frequencytraders-need-a-speed-limit [https://perma.cc/AQ5U-SZBS].
120. Specialists and floor traders quoted a two-sided market at a “spread.” See JERRY W.
MARKHAM ET AL., CORPORATE FINANCE: DEBT, EQUITY AND DERIVATIVE MARKETS AND THEIR
INTERMEDIARIES 546–47 (3d ed. 2011) (describing profiting from the spread). That is, the
specialist or floor trader would quote both a “bid” (buy) and “ask” (sell or offer). See id. The bid
in this spread would be less than the ask price. See id. This meant that all things being equal the
specialists or floor traders would profit by the difference in the spread as other traders bought and
sold from those market makers. See id. Market makers never take “long-term views on where
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concern that, in the absence of such market makers, liquidity gaps might
occur. This is because the specialists and floor traders would no longer
be willing to risk their capital to provide liquidity in the absence of their
former time and place advantage and ability to profit on the spread.
To address this liquidity concern, the exchanges adopted various fee
arrangements that compensated traders, such as HFTs, to provide
liquidity to their markets and to charge traders benefiting from that
liquidity—the so-called “maker-taker” exchange liquidity model. As the
SEC described these arrangements:
[T]he predominant transaction pricing structure that
developed among equities exchanges to attract order flow is
the “maker-taker” fee model. Specifically, out of thirteen
equities exchanges, seven utilize the “maker-taker” fee
model, in which they pay a rebate to a provider of liquidity
and charge a fee to a taker of liquidity. Among the remaining
exchanges, four utilize a “taker-maker” pricing model (also
called an inverted model) where they charge a fee to a
provider of liquidity and pay a rebate to a taker of liquidity,
and two have a “flat fee” model. In recent years this area has
attracted considerable attention and generated significant
debate, focusing on the effects, both positive and negative,
that exchange transaction-based pricing models may have on
market quality and execution quality . . . .121
Informational and transmission advantages allow HFTs to receive
order-book information on pending and executed orders before other
traders. The HFTs now have the equivalent of the time and place
advantage once enjoyed by the stock exchange specialists and floor
traders in the open outcry pits. Moreover, the HFTs are specially
compensated through rebates for their liquidity-providing orders. The
HFTs’ ability to execute orders at speeds faster than other traders has
allowed them to dominate volume on the futures and securities markets.
By 2009, some two-thirds of stock-market volume were attributable to

stock prices [are] heading. Instead, [they] aim[] to profit off tiny differences between what
investors [are] willing to pay for heavily traded stocks and what others [are] willing to sell them
for.” Aaron Lucchetti, Firms Seek Edge Through Speed As Computer Trading Expands, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2006, 12:01 AM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116615315551251136
[https://perma.cc/JT5Y-PU8D].
121. Transaction Fee Pilot for NMS Stocks, 84 Fed. Reg. 5202, 5202–03 (proposed Feb. 20,
2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 242) (footnotes omitted).
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HFTs.122 One study found that between 2012 and 2014, automated
trading systems accounted for over sixty percent of equity futures.123 By
2010, HFTs had “largely . . . replaced more traditional types of liquidity
providers in the equity markets.”124
Regulation NMS laid the groundwork for this market transformation
without much consideration of the consequences of its effects:
The SEC adopted a system [in Regulation NMS] that put
the premium on speed in execution at a specific price,
without considering the effect it would have upon the
balance between market professionals’ duties and
responsibilities to customers and the effects on the market in
general. Regulation NMS essentially shifted the duties from
the specialists and market makers to the traders themselves
by imposing rules that required brokers to execute orders in
the fastest manner possible, prompting brokerage firms and
exchanges to interconnect and develop sophisticated
computer systems to route trades in a maze-like fashion.125

122. Jason Zweig, Staying Calm in a World of Dark Pools, Dark Doings, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
24, 2009, 11:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB125633417039504555?ns=prod/accountswsj [https://perma.cc/Q4WX-98CN].
123. RICHARD HAYNES & JOHN S. ROBERTS, AUTOMATED TRADING IN FUTURES MARKETS 4,
5 tbl.3 (2015), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@economicanalysis/documents/file/oce_
automatedtrading.pdf [https://perma.cc/E8RL-RUZR].
124. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594, 3607 (proposed Jan.
21, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 242). The SEC noted in that regard:
Highly automated exchange systems and liquidity rebates have helped
establish a business model for a new type of professional liquidity provider that
is distinct from the more traditional exchange specialist and over-the-counter
(“OTC”) market maker. In particular, proprietary trading firms and the
proprietary trading desks of multi-service broker-dealers now take advantage of
low-latency systems and liquidity rebates by submitting large numbers of nonmarketable orders (often cancelling a very high percentage of them), which
provide liquidity to the market electronically.
Id. at 3599. The dark side of these rebates has been the entry of large numbers of fictitious trades
that give the false appearance of liquidity. See, e.g., In re Gelber Group, LLC, CFTC No. 13-15,
2013 WL 525839 (Feb. 8, 2013); Rosenthal Collins Capital Markets, LLC, CFTC No. 17-17, 2017
WL 2839495 (June 29, 2017).
125. Bradley J. Bondi, Memo To Michael Lewis: The Excesses of High-Speed Trading Are a
Direct Result of SEC Micromanagement, FORBES (Apr. 29, 2014, 10:46 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/04/29/memo-to-michael-lewis-the-excesses-of-highspeed-trading-are-a-direct-result-of-sec-micromanagement/ [https://perma.cc/24Q9-EHWX].
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B. NMS Data Sharing Requirements
The SEC’s conceptual NMS sought “to link securities markets nationwide in order to distribute market data economically and equally and to
promote fair competition among all market participants.”126 Key to this
goal was uniform market availability of market data.127 This included a
centralized display of price quotations for stocks traded in multiple
markets.128 As implemented, Regulation NMS requires exchanges and
other market centers to make information on prices and volumes available
automatically for all securities in all markets and to allow all qualified
broker–dealers access to the markets.129

126. NetCoalition v. SEC, 615 F.3d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 2010), superseded by statute, Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010), as recognized in NetCoalition v. SEC, 715 F.3d 342 (D.C. Cir. 2013); see also
NetCoalition, 715 F.3d at 345 (quoting the language used in NetCoalition I).
127. As was noted in one report on this issue:
Information is the lifeblood of a financial market and the procedures for
collecting and disseminating information have a direct impact on the public’s
trust and confidence in the financial system. The importance of market
information was stated elegantly by the Securities and Exchange
Commission . . . when it noted that a “consolidated, real-time stream of market
information has been an essential element in the success of the U.S. securities
markets. It is the principal tool for enhancing the transparency of the buying and
selling interest in a security, for addressing the fragmentation of the buying and
selling interest among different market centers, and for facilitating the best
execution of customers’ orders by their broker-dealers.”
MICHAEL J. BARCLAY, REPORT TO THE SEC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON MARKET INFORMATION RE:
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE NO. 34-42208, at 1 (2001), https://www.sec.gov/
divisions/marketreg/marketinfo/appendixk.pdf [https://perma.cc/423M-LGZV] (quoting SEC
Concept Release: Regulation of Market Information and Revenues, Release No. 34-4228, at 4).
128. SEC, supra note 93, at 11.
129. In adopting Regulation NMS, the SEC stated that:
Regulation NMS includes new substantive rules that are designed to modernize
and strengthen the regulatory structure of the U.S. equity markets. First, the
“Order Protection Rule” requires trading centers to establish, maintain, and
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent the
execution of trades at prices inferior to protected quotations displayed by other
trading centers, subject to an applicable exception. To be protected, a quotation
must be immediately and automatically accessible. Second, the “Access Rule”
requires fair and non-discriminatory access to quotations, establishes a limit on
access fees to harmonize the pricing of quotations across different trading
centers . . . .
Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,496 (June 29, 2005) (to be codified in scattered sections
of 17 C.F.R.).
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The NMS resulted in the creation of market data that was, in some
instances, necessary for market participants to meet their NMS
obligations and, in other instances useful, though not necessary. Market
data is “distributed exclusively by exchanges in a two-tier system
comprised of (1) a stream that distributes [to the public] ‘best-priced’
quotations and ‘last-sale’ [prices] for securities, and [(2)] faster
proprietary data products that include ‘depth-of-book’ information that
shows all other bid offers.”130 The SEC classified these two tiers as “core
data” and “non-core data,” and further authorized the exchanges to sell
this data to market participants.131 Core data is used by industry
participants to meet their “best execution”132 and “trade-through”133
obligations under Regulation NMS.134 Core data is consolidated from
130. Market Data, supra note 5.
131. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. at 37,569. “Because exchanges control both tiers of
information, they have enormous pricing power over the cost to access the data.” Market Data,
supra note 5. As the SEC noted:
When a market participant submits an order to an exchange (or cancels or
modifies one), or when an exchange executes an order, that action creates data
that is valuable to other market participants because of the information it
provides about the price and quantity of executed transactions and the investor
trading interest in particular securities. Because that data is valuable
(individually and in combination with other order and execution data), the
exchanges sell that data to market participants. Exchanges have packaged and
monetized the provision of market data in several ways, including monetizing
within the following two categories of data: core and non-core data.
Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84,432, 2018 WL
5023228, at *4 (Oct. 16, 2018) (footnote omitted).
132. The best execution requirement requires broker–dealers to execute customer orders at
the national best bid or offer (NBBO) available on any exchange where the security is traded. See
FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 15-46, at 2 (2015), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/
notice_doc_file_ref/Notice_Regulatory_15-46.pdf [https://perma.cc/874J-36WT] (describing the
best execution obligation).
133. The trade through or “order protection” rule prevents the execution of orders at prices
less favorable than pending orders on any exchange. Memorandum from SEC Division of Trading
& Markets to the SEC Market Structure Advisory Committee (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.sec.
gov/spotlight/emsac/memo-rule-611-regulation-nms.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7BL-J5ME] (describing
the “trade-through” rule).
134. The SEC has noted:
Core data for each NMS security consists of three components: (1) last sale
reports, which include the price at which the latest sale of the security occurred,
the size of the sale, and the exchange where the execution took place; (2) the
current highest bid and lowest offer for the security, along with the number of
shares available at those prices, at each exchange; and (3) the “national best bid
and offer,” or NBBO, which is the highest bid and lowest offer currently
available on a U.S. exchange and the exchange(s) where those prices are
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NMS market participants by central data processers called “securities
information processors” (SIPs).135 These are “monopolistic” entities that
operate under joint industry plans that are controlled by the exchanges
and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).136 The SEC’s
“Access Rule” in Regulation NMS “requires fair and non-discriminatory
access to quotations, [and] establishes a limit on access fees to harmonize
the pricing of quotations across different trading centers. . . .”137
The exchanges also generate, and charge fees for, additional market
data that the SEC labels as “non-core data.”138 This information is not
required to be reported to SIPs for central distribution.139 Instead, the
exchanges may sell this information separately to HFTs or other market
participants.140 Non-core data includes depth-of-order book information
that plays a key role in the algorithmic trading of HFTs.141 Non-core data

available.
Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84,432, 2018 WL
5023228, at *4 (Oct. 16, 2018) (footnote omitted).
135. Id.
136. Id. The development of this process was described by one court as follows:
Prior to 1975, the U.S. stock market was fragmented among several stock
exchanges. In general, investors seeking to purchase a stock on a particular
exchange interacted only with investors also trading on that exchange, and stocks
were often traded at different prices on different exchanges. In 1975, Congress
amended the Exchange Act to, among other things, give the SEC authority to
issue rules that would stitch the disparate exchanges into a single national market.
Since those amendments, the SEC has enacted a host of regulations to fulfill
Congress's vision of a unified national stock market. In 2005, those measures
were consolidated into a rule known as “Regulation NMS” (“NMS” being short
for “national market system”), which, among other things, requires exchanges to
produce national market system plans (“NMS Plans”) to facilitate the
development and operation of a national market for securities. Pursuant to its
NMS Plan, an exchange must transmit real-time information regarding
transactions on that exchange to a centralized entity (the “Processor”) that then
consolidates the information into a single, unified data feed (or “consolidated
feed”).
In re Barclays Liquidity Cross & High Frequency Trading Litig., 126 F. Supp. 3d 342, 348–49
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citations omitted), vacated, 878 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017).
137. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,496 (June 29, 2005) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.).
138. Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84,432, 2018
WL 5023228, at *4 (Oct. 16, 2018).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. “Broadly speaking, this term [depth-of-order book] refers to the quantity of buying and
selling interest and the potential activity on each side of the market.” SEC, REPORT OF SPECIAL
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may be supplied to HFTs in advance of the core data supplied to other
market participants.142 “These time and information differences may
offer valuable trading opportunities.”143
The fees charged by the exchanges for non-core data are substantial.
Professional traders (including HFTs) pay a monthly fee for direct access
to this data, plus a monthly fee for each device using the data.144 Nonprofessional traders pay a lower per-device fee to broker–dealers
subscribing to this service.145 However, this information is not supplied
directly to non-professional customers. Rather, they have to obtain it
indirectly from their broker-dealers or other firms having data
distribution licenses issued by the exchanges.146 This causes a substantial
STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, H.R. DOC. NO.
88-95, pt. 2, at 17 (1963). The SEC has further described this non-core data as follows:
In addition to the best bids and offers available on an exchange, depth-of-book
data includes the outstanding limit orders to buy stocks at prices lower, or to sell
stocks at prices higher, than the best prices on each exchange. In other words,
and using a potential purchase as an example, depth-of-book data provides a
trader who may want to buy a number of shares that exceeds the number of shares
available at the best price with the number of displayed shares available at prices
that are higher than the best price. This information allows the trader to determine
the degree to which the total purchase price for her larger purchase would be
expected to differ from what the broker would pay if the trade were smaller in
size and could be executed in full at the prevailing best price. If a larger purchase
could be executed at or close to the prevailing best price, the market is said to
have “depth”—specifically, depth on the ask side (e.g., willing sellers at or just
above the prevailing best price).
Depth-of-book data provides market participants with other valuable
supplemental information. For example, depth-of-book-data can provide a trader
with the ability to calculate market imbalance information at various price levels.
This information allows the trader to gain a fuller picture of the balance of supply
and demand within a market across multiple price levels, which could potentially
provide a directional market signal. Turning back to the example of a broker
seeking to execute a large purchase, if there is depth on the ask side of the market
(those willing to sell) so that the larger purchase can be made at or slightly above
the prevailing market price but there is little depth on the bid side of the market
(those willing to buy), that imbalance may provide a bearish signal.
Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84,432, 2018 WL
5023228, at *5 (Oct. 16, 2018) (footnotes omitted).
142. Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84,432, 2018
WL 5023228, at *5 (Oct. 16, 2018).
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., id. at *6 (noting that there was a monthly fee for direct access to the data feed
and for devices used).
145. See, e.g., id. (explaining that professional subscribers paid $30 in monthly device fees
while nonprofessionals paid $10).
146. See id.
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latency disadvantage, especially when the trader does not have the benefit
of server co-location. The exchanges thus provide privileged access to
this data to some 100 firms that have been responsible for up to ninety
percent of trades.147 Ultimately, the exchanges provide unequal access to
critical trading data, and this small universe of HFTs is uniquely qualified
to exploit it through co-location and algorithmic trading.148
HFTs are favored in other ways. As noted above, electronic exchanges
provide monetary incentives to HFTs that supply liquidity to the market
and thereby help fill gaps in order matching.149 Such incentives are
necessary because the HFTs are not subject to any market-making
obligations, such as those previously imposed on specialists.150 Instead,
the exchanges pay for order flow originated by the HFTs, creating a selfserving circle of revenue between the HFTs and the exchanges.151 This
arrangement allows the HFTs to prey on other slower, less-informed
traders.
C. SEC Market Data Rate Setting Efforts
1. Background
The 1960s witnessed a sea change in the approach taken by the courts
and the SEC in the control exercised by stock exchanges over their
trading data. In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,152 the United States
Supreme Court held that the antitrust laws applied to the actions of NYSE
in cutting off direct telephone connections that were transmitting market
data from member firms to non-member firms.153 The Court recognized
that the non-member subscribers should have been given notice and
opportunity to be heard before those links were severed.154 That decision,
however, provides little or no antitrust protection to persons seeking
access to exchange market data. In other cases, the Supreme Court held
that the antitrust laws preempted the federal securities laws where the
challenged actions were subject to SEC oversight.155
147. See id. at *18.
148. See id.
149. See Picardo, supra note 117.
150. See supra notes 72, 76–77 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text (describing the fee arrangements used
to manage market liquidity).
152. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
153. Id. at 365.
154. Id. The connections that were severed included stock ticker service directly to the
plaintiff from the NYSE floor. Id. at 344.
155. See, e.g., Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 283 (2007) (finding
underwriting activities enjoyed antitrust immunity because of SEC oversight); Gordon v. N.Y.
Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 691 (1975); see also United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers,
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The SEC conducts oversight of exchange market data fees, but that
oversight may not completely shield the exchanges from private actions
under the federal securities laws. In City of Providence v. BATS Global
Markets, Inc.,156 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that stock exchanges were subject to liability under the antimanipulation provisions of the Securities Exchange Act with respect to
their two-tier system for fees charged to HFTs and the fees charged to
other traders with more limited access to market data.157 The Second
Circuit rejected a claim that the exchanges’ self-regulatory role and SEC
oversight granted the exchanges absolute immunity from lawsuits
challenging their fees.158 The Court held that this conduct, if proved, was
actionable under the Securities Exchange Act.159
Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 734–35 (1975) (implying repeal of antitrust laws for resale restrictions for
mutual fund shares).
156. 878 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 341 (2018).
157. Id. at 51–52. As the Second Circuit described these claims:
Here, plaintiffs allege that the defendant exchanges created products and
services for HFT firms that illicitly “rigged the market” in the firms' favor in
exchange for hundreds of millions of dollars in fees. According to plaintiffs,
these products and services provided HFT firms with the ability to access market
data at a faster rate, obtain non-public information, and take priority over
ordinary investors' trades. Plaintiffs further allege that the exchanges failed to
disclose the full impact that such products and services would have on market
activity and knowingly created a false appearance of market liquidity that,
unbeknownst to plaintiffs, resulted in their bids and orders not being filled at the
best available prices.
. . . Plaintiffs further allege that, unbeknownst to them, the proprietary data
feeds and co-location services provided HFT firms with virtually exclusive
access to detailed trading data in time to “front-run” other market participants by
anticipating large pending transactions, buying and driving up the prices for the
stocks before those orders were placed, and forcing investors to pay more for
those stocks than they otherwise would have.
Id. at 49.
158. Id. at 48.
159. Id. at 52. Earlier, in Lanier v. BATS Exchange, Inc., the Second Circuit upheld the
dismissal of breach of contract claims charging that stock exchanges were allowing HFTs to
access market data faster than other market participants receiving information from securities
information processors. Lanier v. BATS Exch., Inc., 838 F.3d 139, 142–43 (2d Cir. 2016). The
Court held that such claims were preempted by the Securities Exchange Act and that the SEC had
authorized such disparate access. Id. at 143. In another case, Citadel Securities LLC v. Chicago
Board Options Exchange, Inc., a district court held that the CBOE was immune from a suit
challenging fees charged by that exchange to market makers as payments for order flow from
customers. Citadel Sec. LLC v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., Inc., No. 16 C 9747, 2018 WL 5264195,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2018). The suit claimed the exchange was not properly monitoring whether
trades were subject to the fees. Id. at *1, *4. The court ruled that that such activity was within the
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The SEC’s efforts to oversee the amounts of fees charged by the
exchanges for non-core data have been challenged twice in the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals. In the first challenge, NetCoalition v.
SEC,160 the court held that the SEC could properly allow market forces,
i.e., competition among the exchanges in attracting order flow, to assure
that fees were fair and reasonable.161 The court also held, however, that
the record evidence considered by the SEC did not support its conclusion
as to the effectiveness of that competition.162
The same fees were challenged again after remand, but the D.C.
Circuit concluded that it did not have the power to review the exchange
rule in the absence of an order of the SEC resolving a challenge to the
fees.163 The SEC issued such an order on October 16, 2018.164 There, the
SEC reversed itself, finding that market forces were not shown to be
adequate to assure that exchange fees are reasonable and fair.165 The
exchanges must now seek to justify their claim that market discipline
makes a public utility-like rate setting decision by the SEC unnecessary.
Following that decision, a number of large institutional traders and HFTs
announced plans to create a low-cost electronic that would provide
reduced fees for members and compete with NYSE and Nasdaq.166 If
successful, this venture would be a return to the exchanges of yesteryear
that provided privileged time and place access to members at reduced
fees.167
regulatory role of the exchange and, therefore, immune from suit. Id. at *4; see also In re Barclays
Liquidity Cross & High Frequency Trading Litig., 126 F. Supp. 3d 342, 359–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)
(dismissing similar claims on grounds of exchange immunity and failure to properly plead other
allegations), vacated, 878 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2017); cf. Zola v. TD Ameritrade, Inc. 889 F.3d 920
(8th Cir. 2019) (preempting a state class action with respect to claim that defendant routed orders
to venues where HFTs could take advantage of the orders in exchange for rebates).
160. 615 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2010), superseded by statute, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), as recognized
in NetCoalition v. SEC, 715 F.3d 342 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
161. Id. at 535.
162. Id. at 537–44.
163. NetCoalition, 715 F.3d at 354.
164. See Application of Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, Exchange Act Release No. 84,432,
2018 WL 5023228 (Oct. 16, 2018).
165. Id. at *2–3.
166. See Diptendu Lahiri, Wall Street Financial Firms Plan New Exchange to Challenge
NYSE, Nasdaq, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2019, 8:56 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/wallstreetexchange/wall-street-financial-firms-plan-new-exchange-to-challenge-nyse-nasdaq-idUSL3N1
Z73S9 [https://perma.cc/J4JP-AY5J].
167. Other new exchanges are also forming to compete with existing exchanges for market
data fees. See, e.g., Alexander Osipovich & Gunjan Banerji, As Stock Exchanges Multiply, Miami
Wants In on the Game, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 4, 2019, 8:02 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/stockexchange-competition-heats-up-as-miax-eyes-launch-11551704521 [https://perma.cc/7FRD-YCZF].
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2. Transaction Fees
Coupled with the uncertainty over the fairness of market data fees is
the related concern over fees for completed transactions through
exchange facilities, so-called core data. The SEC established a uniform
limitation on data fees for this market data as a part of Regulation
NMS.168 That appropriation of exchange proprietary information is
inconsistent with the view that information is a commodity that should
trade freely at prices set by the market, not the government. It is, however,
necessary for the operation of the NMS’s mandate of best execution169
and for the enforcement of the trade through the rule because such
information is needed to meet those obligations.170 The SEC, therefore,
mandated the disclosure of the exchange market data needed to carry out
that and other NMS obligations for linked stock markets. “The
implementation of this mandate by the SEC did improve linkages
between exchanges, but it also weakened the property rights of
information producers.”171
In 2018, the SEC went further in its determination to regulate market
data by mandating a pilot program that it will use to analyze the effects
of execution fees and related rebate pricing that encourage traders to
conduct a large volume of transactions on particular exchanges.172 That
pilot program will seek to determine the effects of execution fees and
rebates, including maker-taker payments, “on order routing behavior,
execution quality, and market quality.”173 The SEC’s pilot fee program
separates listed stocks into groups with different fee price controls for
each of those categories.174 NYSE challenged this pilot fee program in
court, charging that the plan was an “unnecessary exercise in government
price-setting that will add a new layer of complexity to equity
markets.”175 NYSE further asserted that “the SEC’s pilot cuts at the heart
168. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,503 (June 29, 2005) (to be codified in
scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.) (setting the uniform fee limitation at $0.003 per share).
169. See id. at 37,505.
170. See id. at 37,496, 37,503.
171. Corinne Bronfman & James A. Overdahl, Would the Invisible Hand Produce
Transparent Markets 7 (Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, Working Paper No. 92-10, 1993).
172. See 17 C.F.R. § 242.610T (2019); Transaction Fee Pilot for NMS Stocks, 84 Fed. Reg.
5202, 5203 (Feb. 20, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 242).
173. Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Transaction Fee Pilot for NMS Stocks (Dec. 19,
2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-298 [https://perma.cc/JH7N-V4NE].
174. Transaction Fee Pilot for NMS Stocks, 84 Fed. Reg. at 5203.
175. Stacy Cunningham, We’re Suing the SEC to Protect the Stock Market, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
14, 2019, 6:57 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/were-suing-the-sec-to-protect-the-stockmarket-11550188636 [https://perma.cc/NS95-6WKW]. The SEC stayed its pilot program
pending the outcome of this litigation. Alexander Osipovich, SEC Delays Program to Rein in
Rebates in Win for Stock Exchanges, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
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of NYSE’s core mission of providing an orderly, transparent and efficient
marketplace.”176
3. Clearing Fees
The SEC also has inconsistently regulated clearing fees charged by
the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC). The OCC was designated
under the Dodd–Frank Act177 as a systemically important financial utility,
which subjected it to increased regulatory scrutiny.178 The OCC then
developed a capital enhancement plan that included an increase in the
amount of the capital contributions of its shareholder exchange
members.179 Those shareholders were to be compensated for their
contributions from fees charged to clearing members that use the OCC to
clear and settle trades.180 The action was approved by the SEC in
deference to the OCC’s determination of its necessity, but was later
challenged in the D.C. Circuit.181 That court held that the SEC had failed
to consider properly whether this plan was consistent with requirements
in the Securities Exchange Act governing the OCC.182
The circuit court remanded the issue to the SEC for its further
consideration.183 The plan was then again challenged by SIFMA.184 The
SEC thereafter reversed its earlier position and rejected the OCC fees for
its capital plan.185 The SEC took this action on the grounds that the OCC
did not comply with its bylaws in adopting the new fee structure and that
there was a lack of information from the OCC to justify the fee charges
as not being a burden on competition.186

sec-delays-program-to-rein-in-rebates-in-win-for-stock-exchanges-11553827006 [https://perma.
cc/8MJY-SDMZ].
176. Id.
177. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–
5641 (2012)).
178. See Susquehanna Int’l Grp., LLP v. SEC, 866 F.3d 442, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
179. See id. at 444.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 444–46.
182. See id. at 446. For example, the Securities Exchange Act requires that a clearing agency
“not impose any burden on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the
purposes of” the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(b)(3)(I) (2012).
183. Susquehanna Int’l Grp., 866 F.3d at 451.
184. Letter from Ellen Greene, Managing Dir., SIFMA, to Brent J. Fields, Sec’y, SEC 2
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Response-to-OCC-CapitalPlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/5EWJ-WS4U].
185. See Order Disapproving Proposed Rule Change Concerning the Options Clearing
Corporation’s Capital Plan, 84 Fed. Reg. 5157 (Feb. 13, 2019).
186. See id.
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III. COMMODITY FUTURES MARKETS
The CFTC regulates commodity futures exchanges under the CEA.187
Commodity futures exchanges deal in derivative instruments, i.e.,
futures, options, and swaps.188 Historically, the commodities underlying
those contracts were agricultural products.189 Today, most of those
underlying commodities are financial instruments that are subject to SEC
regulation.190 Nevertheless, futures and options on such instruments are
regulated by the CFTC when their derivatives are traded on a futures
exchange.191 Although there has been much debate over whether this
interconnection between the securities and commodity markets justifies
consolidated regulation of both markets, political forces have blocked
efforts to achieve that goal.192 Instead, the two markets have separate and,
in many cases, quite different regulations.193 For example, there is no
legislation supporting the development of an NMS in the commodity
futures markets. The CFTC has not advocated the adoption of such a
regulatory approach. As a consequence, there is no national market

187. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27f.
188. See Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Commodity Futures and Exchange-Traded
Options, 264 Sec. Prac. Portfolio Series (BNA), at A-1 to -8 (2015) (describing the elements of,
and differences between, futures, options and swap contracts).
189. See Markham, supra note 80, at 982 (describing the regulation of futures contracts on
agricultural commodities).
190. James Chen, What is a Derivative?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/
ask/answers/12/derivative.asp [https://perma.cc/TY3Q-DBBU] (last updated May 19, 2019).
191. See Markham, supra note 80, at 1001 nn.126–27.
192. In 2008, the U.S. Treasury Department recommended that the CFTC and SEC be
consolidated into a single agency. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED
FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 11 (2008). The Financial Crisis of 2008 delayed that effort,
but a Treasury Department report issued in 2009 sought coordinated regulation among financial
services regulators, particularly the SEC and CFTC. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL
REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND
REGULATION 50 (2009). A joint study by the CFTC and the SEC sought to harmonize their
regulations. See U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC, A JOINT REPORT OF THE
SEC AND THE CFTC ON HARMONIZATION OF REGULATION 1–2 (2009). However, the Dodd-Frank
Act rejected consolidated regulation. Instead, it divided jurisdiction over swaps between the SEC
and the CFTC. See Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of Swap and Other Over-the-Counter
Derivative Contracts, 263 Sec. Prac. Portfolio Series (BNA), at A-17 (2014). The SEC was given
jurisdiction over securities swaps, and the CFTC was given jurisdiction over commodity swaps.
Id. Joint jurisdiction was given to the SEC and CFTC over “mixed” swaps that had characteristics
of both securities and commodity swaps. See id.
193. See Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and CFTC—A Clash of Cultures, 78 CIN. L.
REV. 537, 544, 548, 552 (2009) (describing those differences and the history between the agencies
that keep them separate).
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system for futures trading. Rather, futures and options on particular
underlying commodities are usually traded on only one exchange.194
Like the stock exchanges, the commodity futures markets sell noncore data at prices that are tiered based on the level of access sought by
traders.195 The greater the access to an exchange’s order-books’ market
depth, the higher the fees charged by vendors distributing that market data
and by exchanges for co-location of servers.196 Unlike the SEC, the CFTC
does not seek to regulate exchange market data fees. Congress amended
the CEA in 2000 to include a requirement that commodity futures
exchanges “shall make public daily information on settlement prices,
volume, open interest, and opening and closing ranges for actively traded
contracts on the contract market.”197 This required data disclosure is
principally used to price open positions or inventory at the end of the

194. The SEC advocated, as a part of its NMS effort, for the development of common
clearing and the elimination of exchange rules that curb competition between stock exchanges in
the same securities. See Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,596 (June 29, 2005) (to be
codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.). The result has been often fierce competition between
exchanges. In contrast, commodity futures exchanges generally do not compete with each other
with respect to particular contracts. See James Chen, Against Actual, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/againstactual.asp [https://perma.cc/794D-J4QW] (last
updated May 27, 2018). It is a winner-take-all competition, which means, once market share is
gained, one exchange will own all trading in the contract as long as it is of interest to traders. This
exchange monopoly has been fostered by the lack of common clearing in the futures industry. The
Department of Justice has noted:
[T]he control exercised by futures exchanges over clearing services – including
(a) where positions in a futures contract are held (“open interest”), and (b)
whether positions may be treated as fungible or offset with positions held in
contracts traded on other exchanges (“margin offsets”) – has made it difficult for
exchanges to enter and compete in the trading of financial futures contracts. If
greater head-to-head competition for the exchange of futures contracts could
develop, we would expect it to result in greater innovation in exchange systems,
lower trading fees, reduced tick size, and tighter spreads, leading to increased
trading volume.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TREAS-DO-2007-0018, COMMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES DEP’T OF
JUSTICE 1 (2008).
195. See, e.g., Licensing Market Data, CME GROUP, https://www.cmegroup.com/marketdata/licensing-market-data.html [https://perma.cc/CNN9-7H5M].
196. See, e.g., How Much Does Market Data Cost and What Data Do I Need?, TRADOVATE,
https://tradovate.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/115011506088-How-much-does-market-datacost-and-what-data-do-I-need- [https://perma.cc/AS59-3PER] (illustrating that Market Depth
Level 2 Data costs more than Top of Book Level 1 Data).
197. Section 7 of Title 7 of the U.S. Code added to the CEA by the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 7, 11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). See 7 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
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trading day.198 It does not provide “non-core” data in the form of depthof-order-book pending limit orders.199 More timely, real-time disclosures
were required by the Dodd–Frank Act200 in 2010 for swaps
transactions.201 CFTC regulations adopted under that statute require realtime disclosure of swap transactions and pricing data.202 Nevertheless,
those rules allow delayed reporting for certain large trades in which
immediate disclosure could have undue market effects and harm traders
whose positions would be exposed to other traders.203
The fact that the CFTC does not regulate exchange fees for exchange
generated market data makes those fees more susceptible to antitrust
challenges.204 As is the case for stock exchanges, the federal antitrust
laws are not explicitly preempted by CFTC regulatory oversight.
Nevertheless, courts find an implied repeal when necessary, to make the
CEA work and where the CFTC is actively regulating the subject of an
antitrust claim.205 The courts have yet to fully assess the application of
the antitrust laws and the effects of the CFTC’s hands-off approach to
exchange data fee regulation. In one case, Braman v. CME Group, Inc.,206
a district court dismissed manipulation and fraud claims brought under
the CEA, antitrust law, and other laws concerning preferred access for
HFTs to exchange market data.207 Rather than finding an implied repeal,

198. The CFTC is charged with updating net-position-changes data for FCMs. Net Position
Changes Data, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, https://www.cftc.gov/
MarketReports/NetPositionChangesData/index.htm [https://perma.cc/SHC2-59QU].
199. 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(8) (referencing “settlement prices, volume, open interest, and opening
and closing ranges” as data that shall be made public, but not non-core data).
200. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5301
(2012)).
201. Id. at 1696.
202. 17 C.F.R. § 43.1 (2018).
203. 17 C.F.R. § 43.5 (2018); see also Real-Time Public Reporting of Swap Transaction
Data, 77 Fed. Reg. 1182, 1184–85 (proposed Jan. 9, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 43)
(explaining that the “market impact” should be considered by the CFTC when setting time delays).
204. The CFTC has, however, brought and settled administrative cases charging that futures
commission merchants (FCMs) improperly calculated the amount of exchange and clearing fees
that were passed on to the FCMs’ customers. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, CFTC No.
17-28, 2017 WL 4838599 (Sept. 28, 2017); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., CFTC
No. 17-25, 2017 WL 4480414 (Sept. 22, 2017); J.P. Morgan Sec. LLC, CFTC No. 17-04, 2017
WL 948842 (Jan. 11, 2017) (respondent failed to pay out some $7 million in exchange fee
rebates); Barclays Capital, Inc., CFTC No. 16-25, 2016 WL 6522642 (Aug. 4, 2016).
205. See, e.g., Am. Agric. Movement, Inc. v. Bd. of Trade of Chi., 977 F.2d 1147, 1158 (7th
Cir. 1992); see also Strobl v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 768 F.2d 22, 29 (2d Cir. 1985) (failing to
recognize a repeal of the antitrust laws).
206. 149 F. Supp. 3d 874 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
207. Id. at 881. The complaint charged that the exchanges:
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the antitrust claims were dismissed on the grounds that the complaint’s
tiered fee claims failed to establish a conspiracy or monopoly that would
violate the antitrust laws.208
IV. THE LAW OF INSIDER TRADING
A. Securities Markets—Background
The centerpiece of the SEC’s regulatory efforts since the 1960s has
been its effort to combat trading in publicly traded securities using
material, nonpublic “inside” information.209 The SEC made this a crime
through a 1961 administrative consent order styled Cady, Roberts &
Co.210 The SEC reasoned that traders should have equal access to material
nonpublic information that could affect stock prices.211 The order further
stated that traders possessing such information must refrain from trading
in the affected security until the information is disseminated effectively
to the marketplace as a whole.212
Prior to the decision in Cady, Roberts, state courts refused to
recognize insider trading as a cognizable claim under the common law.213
As Professor Barbara Bader Aldave has noted, “the majority common law
rule was that directors and other insiders owed a fiduciary duty to their
corporation, but not to its shareholders, and that such insiders could trade
in the corporation's securities without full disclosure.”214 Indeed, a
leading state law decision dismissing an insider trading claim against
insiders trading in their company’s stock on the Boston stock exchange
together with a sophisticated class of technology-driven entities known
commonly as “high frequency traders” . . . have provided and utilized
information asymmetry along with clandestine incentive agreements and illegal
trading practices to create a two-tiered marketplace that disadvantages the
American public and all other futures marketplace participants, all the while
continuing to represent to the public and their regulators that they continue to
provide transparent and fair trading markets to the global market.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Second Amended Complaint at 1–2, Braman v. CME Grp.,
Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d 874 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (No. 1:14-cv-02646)).
208. See id. 894–96.
209. Markham, supra note 15, at 613–14, 614 n.349.
210. Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638 (Nov. 8, 1961).
211. Id. at *5–6.
212. Id. at *5.
213. A New York court ruled in 1868 that directors of a corporation owed no duty to disclose
nonpublic information about their company before buying or selling its stock. See Carpenter v.
Danforth, 52 Barb. 581, 588 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1968).
214. Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on
Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 104 & n.21 (1984) (noting that “[i]llustrative
cases from eighteen states are cited in Chenery Corp v. SEC”) (emphasis added).
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was handed down only shortly before the SEC was created in 1934.215
Consequently, it may be safely assumed that members of Congress were
on notice that an insider trading prohibition would not be included by
implication in the federal securities laws on the basis of common law
fraud standards then existing. Rather, Congress likely concluded that it
would have to impose such a prohibition expressly in federal legislation,
if such a prohibition was desired.
Congress did not include the insider trading prohibition now claimed
by the SEC in the federal securities laws when those statutes were
adopted in the 1930s.216 That omission was telling in light of the fact that
insider trading was criticized in congressional hearings on the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.217 After considering these concerns, Congress
included only a very narrow insider trading prohibition, instead of the
broader insider trader prohibition created by the SEC in the Cady, Roberts
case. That provision is found in § 16 of the Securities Exchange Act,
which precludes a narrow range of “insiders,” i.e., officers, directors, and
shareholders holding more than ten percent of a public company’s stock,
from making a profit from transactions conducted within six months of
each other.218 Non-insiders were not subject to this provision, and the
identified insiders were free to trade for a profit if they had owned their
company’s stock for more than six months.219
The scope of the Cady, Roberts insider trading prohibition knows no
such boundaries. As posited in that decision, anyone, anywhere, commits
fraud by trading on material, nonpublic “inside” information about a
public company. Although it recognized that the existing common law on
insider trading was weighted heavily against creating such a crime, the
SEC ruled that it was unconstrained by common law fraud concepts.220
Rather, its opinion asserted that “the securities acts may be said to have
generated a wholly new and far-reaching body of Federal corporation

215. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933).
216. Congress did not add prohibitions on insider trading until it amended the Securities
Exchange Act to increase disclosure requirements in 1964. Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88467, 78 Stat. 565.
217. As Yale Professor William O. Douglas, later SEC chairman and Supreme Court Justice,
noted in 1934: “Recent court records and Senate hearings are replete with specific and illustrative
material [involving] . . . trading in securities of the company by virtue of inside
information. . . . These are not peculiar to recent times. They are forms of business activity long
known to the law.” William O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305,
1306 (1934).
218. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012).
219. See id.
220. See Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638, at *4–6
(Nov. 8, 1961).
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law.”221 Under this uncertain authority, the SEC concluded that its
antifraud powers should incorporate fiduciary duty concepts to engraft
insider trading prohibitions into the securities laws.222
Cady, Roberts cited, as the basis for the creation of its “classical”
insider trading prohibition, the “inherent unfairness involved where a
party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to
those with whom he is dealing.”223 This claim of “unfairness” would
seemingly apply to HFTs trading on nonpublic information that is, as a
practical matter, available only to a limited number of such traders.
Surely, it is no less unfair to allow HFTs, with their already inherent time
and place advantages, to trade on restricted data than it is to allow
corporate insiders to trade.
The Second Circuit generally approved of the insider trading theory
created by the SEC in Cady, Roberts in a high-profile case involving the
Texas Gulf Sulphur Company.224 The Supreme Court, however,
subsequently tried to limit the reach of this administratively invented
crime by requiring proof that the defendant had some duty to maintain
the confidentiality of the information.225 The Court stated that “a duty to
disclose . . . does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market
information.”226 “Moreover, neither the Congress nor the [Securities and
Exchange] Commission ever has adopted a parity-of-information rule.
Instead the problems caused by misuse of market information have been
addressed by detailed and sophisticated regulation that recognizes when
use of market information may not harm operation of the securities
markets.”227
The Supreme Court, nevertheless, left open doors that allowed the
SEC to effectively apply its insider trading theory to a very broad range
of cases. In United States v. O’Hagan,228 the Supreme Court concluded
that it would recognize two forms of insider trading: (1) “classical”
insider trading by a corporate official as in the Cady, Roberts case, and
(2) the “misappropriation” of inside information by third parties.229 In
Dirks v. SEC,230 the Supreme Court further held that someone tipped on
inside information (a “tippee”) by a corporate official (the “tipper”) could
be liable for inside trading if the tipper received some benefit from the
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at *3.
See id. at *4–6.
Id. at *4.
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968).
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232–35 (1980).
Id. at 235.
Id. at 233.
521 U.S. 642 (1997).
Id. at 652.
463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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trading.231 That decision was premised on the somewhat strained theory
that the tippee in such instances inherited the fiduciary duty of the tipper
to keep such information confidential.232
B. Securities Markets—“Classical” Theory for Insider Trading
The “classical” theory of insider trading by corporate officers using
nonpublic information about their company is premised on the agency’s
view that such trading is a breach of those individuals’ fiduciary duty to
their corporate shareholders.233 As noted above, however, prior to the
adoption of the antifraud provision in the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, on which the SEC’s insider trading claims are premised, state
courts had generally ruled that fiduciary duties did not create a basis for
insider trading liability.234
The Supreme Court decisions adopting the SEC’s insider trading
claims have mixed the distinction between a breach of fiduciary duty and
the commission of fraud. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is
an antifraud statute.235 A breach of fiduciary duties, as New York Court
of Appeals Justice Benjamin Cardozo famously asserted in Meinhard v.
Salmon,236 is not dependent on a showing the elements of fraud, such as
fraudulent intent. In Meinhard, the court found a breach of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty even though there was “no thought to hold that Salmon
231. Id. at 661–62. The Supreme Court later clarified that the benefit to the tipper need not
be substantial and that a personal relationship would justify the finding of an indirect benefit.
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–28 (2016).
232. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659.
233. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
234. See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text. To be sure, the Supreme Court held in
Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909), that there may be some unusual, special facts that may
have to be disclosed by insiders trading in their company’s stock. Id. at 431–34 (holding that
insiders having nonpublic information that increased the value of the stock of a company by ten
times current trading prices required disclosure). After the SEC’s announcement of its new insider
trading rule in the Cady, Roberts & Co. case, the New York Court of Appeals held in Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969), that trading on inside information was a breach of
fiduciary duty on the part of corporate employees engaging in such activity. Id. at 914. The New
York court in that opinion expressly recognized the right of action created by the SEC under
Section 10(b) and incorporated it into New York law as a breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 914–15.
That decision was followed by some other states. See, e.g., In re ORFA Sec. Litig., 654 F. Supp.
1449, 1458 (D.N.J. 1987); Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831, 840 (Del. 2011).
The Supreme Court of Florida, however, declined to follow the “innovative ruling” of the New
York Court in Diamond. Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739, 746 (Fla. 1975). The Seventh Circuit
followed the Florida decision in considering the scope of Indiana law on this subject. Freeman v.
Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 196 (7th Cir. 1978).
235. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/securities_exchange_act_of_1934 [https://perma.cc/95S6-WT9D].
236. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
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was guilty of a conscious purpose to defraud” and that “[v]ery likely” he
was acting in “good faith.”237
The Supreme Court did, however, recognize a distinction between the
elements required to establish fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the lower standards adopted by courts for
fiduciary duty violations. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,238 the Court
held that Section 10(b) is a fraud standard that requires “intentional or
willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors.”239 The
Supreme Court went further in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,240
rejecting a claim that SEC Rule 10b-5 brought “within the ambit of the
Rule all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a securities
transaction.”241 The Court further stated that “the claim of fraud and
fiduciary duty breach in the complaint states a cause of action under any
part of Rule 10b-5 only if the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as
‘manipulative or deceptive’ within the meaning of the statute.”242 Of
course, insider trading does not fairly fall within those terms because,
when Section 10(b) was enacted, such activities were not viewed to be
manipulative or deceptive, or even breaches of fiduciary duties.
The Supreme Court partially set aside those principles when it
considered the application of Rule 10b-5 to the classical theory of insider
trading in Chiarella v. United States.243 There, the Court held that a duty
of disclosure would arise under common law where there was “a
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between
them.”244 In finding such a fiduciary duty on the part of corporate insiders
to anonymous purchasers of their company’s stock, the Court cited the
SEC’s Cady, Roberts decision.245 That administrative settlement order,
however, had simply made up that duty, ignoring the long-standing
precedent holding there was no such duty. To the extent that Congress
wanted to prohibit insider trading, it distinctly limited such a restriction
to officers, directors, and ten-percent shareholders making profits from
trading in their company’s stock within a six-month period.246
237. Id. at 548.
238. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
239. Id. at 199. See generally Jerry W. Markham, Fiduciary Duties Under the Commodity
Exchange Act, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 199, 200 (1992) (describing the development of fiduciary
duty concepts at common law and their application to federal laws).
240. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
241. Id. at 472–74.
242. Id. at 473–74.
243. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
244. Id. at 227–28 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST.
1976)).
245. Id. at 226–27.
246. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2012).
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The Court in Chiarella rejected a claim of insider trading under
Section 10(b) where a printer traded on information he discovered while
typesetting disclosure documents that were to be filed with the SEC.247
The Chiarella decision noted that at common law a failure to disclose
material nonpublic information arose only where there was a duty to
disclose.248 Chiarella had no such duty.249 The Court declined to consider
whether the misappropriation of inside information would violate the
Securities Exchange Act because that issue had not been properly raised
in the lower courts.250
In another case, Carpenter v. United States,251 the Supreme Court was
evenly divided on whether insider trading on misappropriated
information violated the federal securities laws.252 In a unanimous
opinion holding that such conduct violated mail and wire fraud statutes,
the Court cited the New York state court opinion in Diamond v.
Oreamuno253 as authority for its recognition of insider trading as the basis
for mail and wire fraud charges.254 The New York court in Diamond
relied on the Cady, Roberts decision in reaching its “innovative ruling,”
which was rejected by state courts that chose to follow common law
precedents rejecting such claims.255
In contrast to the broad reach sought by the SEC in its Cady, Roberts
decision, under Chiarella and Carpenter, outsiders legally gaining
knowledge of inside information could trade on such an information
disparity even if that trading was unfair to other traders. For example, a
famous football coach who overheard a conversation disclosing inside
information while he was sunbathing in a university grandstand could
legally trade on that information.256 In contrast, a psychiatrist trading on
inside information learned from a patient violated Section 10(b) because
he breached a fiduciary duty of confidentiality owed to the patient.257 A
247. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224–25.
248. Id. at 227–28.
249. See id. at 235.
250. Id. at 239.
251. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
252. Id. at 27–28. As described below, the Supreme Court later concluded in O’Hagan that
misappropriation violated Section 10(b). See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 659 (1997).
253. 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969).
254. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27–28.
255. Diamond, 248 N.E.2d at 914. Courts applying Indiana and Florida laws and precedent
have declined to follow this “innovative ruling.” See Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 196 (7th
Cir. 1978); Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739, 746 (Fla. 1975).
256. See SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 766 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (explaining that a football
coach who inadvertently overheard information at a track meet was not barred from trading on
that information under Rule 10b-5).
257. United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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logical distinction between these two cases is missing; the injury suffered
by the traders buying the stock in both cases is identical, but only one set
of traders has a cognizable claim for redress.258
This conversion of a fiduciary duty into a fraud claim becomes even
more convoluted when applied to “tippees,” i.e., persons receiving
nonpublic information from a corporate insider. The SEC claimed that it
was unfair to allow those traders to benefit from nonpublic information
at the expense of others.259 The Supreme Court limited the scope of that
administratively invented extension of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in
Dirks v. SEC. There, Raymond Dirks was tipped by an insider about a
massive fraud scheme that was inflating the value of a company’s
stock.260 Dirks, an investment adviser, was following the company on
behalf of his clients.261 Those clients sold some $16 million of their stock
in the company before the fraud was publicized.262 Even though Dirks
had not traded for his own account, the SEC charged him with insider
trading because he had tipped his clients on the fraud.263 The SEC
contended that “anyone who knowingly receives nonpublic material
information from an insider has a fiduciary duty to disclose before
trading.”264 The Supreme Court held, however, that the mere receipt of
information from an insider does not create such a special relationship
between the tippee and the corporation’s shareholders.265
The Court in Dirks gave general approval to the Cady, Roberts
opinion but reiterated its holding in the Chiarella case, i.e., that Section
10(b) does not require equal information among all traders.266 Rather,
there must be some duty to disclose imposed on the tippee through the
tipper.267 This will occur where the disclosure is in breach of the tipper’s
fiduciary duty.268 The Court in Dirks ruled that such a breach occurs
where the insider, viz., the tipper, will benefit directly or indirectly from
258. Id.
259. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653–54 (1983).
260. Id. at 649.
261. See id.
262. Id. Dirks had tried to alert the SEC and the Wall Street Journal on the fraud, but that
newspaper was skeptical of the claim and refused to publish an article on it until trading in the
company’s stock was halted. See id. at 649–50; Fred Barbash, SEC Censure of Dirks Overturned,
WASH. POST (July 2, 1983), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1983/07/02/seccensure-of-dirks-overturned/b4ffff77-cb79-4432-857e-8d453a306eb8/?utm_term=.03b87d54ac26
[https://perma.cc/243V-6SSJ].
263. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 650–51.
264. Id. at 656.
265. Id. at 656 n.15.
266. Id. at 655–59.
267. See id. at 657–58.
268. See id. at 659.
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the disclosure because “absent a breach by the insider, there is no
derivative breach.”269 The Court stated that such a breach could occur
where a gift of confidential information is given to a friend or relative,
because it would be the equivalent of trading by the insider and then
giving the profits to the friend or relative.270
The non-core market data sold by the exchanges to the HFTs is
nonpublic material information with which HFTs are tipped in exchange
for fees. Nevertheless, the SEC has allowed the exchanges to sell this
information to HFTs on a preferred basis, which conflicts with the action
taken by the SEC in the wake of the Dirks case. There, the Court noted
the importance of the role of investment advisers in ferreting out
information by meeting individually with corporate officers or others
who have inside information.271 “It is the nature of this type of
information, and indeed of the markets themselves, that such information
cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the corporation’s
stockholders or the public generally.”272
The Court refused to hold Dirks liable as an insider when he tipped
his clients with inside information.273 Despite that ruling, the SEC refused
to drop its Cady, Roberts mandate of equal access to nonpublic
information after losing on that issue in Dirks. Instead, the SEC
promulgated Regulation FD (Regulation Fair Disclosure).274 That
regulation prohibits the officers of public companies from making
selective disclosures of company matters to financial analysts,
institutional investors, or other traders.275 Such officers may discuss
company operations only with an analyst and only in meetings open to
all analysts.276 This restriction was intended to prevent traders, like Dirks,
from receiving selective disclosures that allow them to get a jump on
other traders.277 In adopting Regulation FD, the SEC stated that “to the
269. Id. at 662.
270. Id. at 664. In a subsequent case, Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016), the
Supreme Court held that the benefit bestowed on the tipper needed to establish tippee liability for
a friend or relative tipped on inside information need not be direct or “pecuniary or similarly
valuable in nature.” Id. at 425 (quoting United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2014),
abrogated in part by Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428).
271. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 665.
274. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2018).
275. See id.
276. See Selective Disclosure & Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7887, Exchange
Act Release No. 42,259, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,209, 1999 WL 1217849
(proposed Dec. 19, 2000).
277. See Antony Page & Katy Yang, Controlling Corporate Speech: Is Regulation Fair
Disclosure Unconstitutional?, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 11 (2005) (discussing application of
Regulation FD).
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maximum extent practicable, [we believe that all investors should] have
access to an issuer’s material disclosures at the same time.”278 This was
viewed to be a matter of “fundamental fairness to all investors.”279 The
SEC further stated that
Issuer selective disclosure bears a close resemblance in
this regard to ordinary “tipping” and insider trading. In both
cases, a privileged few gain an informational edge – and the
ability to use that edge to profit – from their superior access
to corporate insiders, rather than from their skill, acumen, or
diligence.280
This concern would seemingly apply to non-core exchange data sold
selectively to HFTs. The tiered pricing for that information effectively
denies access by other traders to such data on a timely basis. As the SEC
stated with respect to Regulation FD:
Although the antifraud provisions of the securities laws
do not require that all traders possess equal information
when they trade, we believe that our disclosure rules should
promote fair treatment of large and small investors by,
among other things, giving all investors timely access to
material information an issuer chooses to disclose.281
C. Commodity Markets—“Classical” Insider Trading Claims Rejected
Inside information in the commodity markets takes many forms. For
example, businesses use these markets to hedge themselves against
commercial price risks. These risks may flow from the loss of value in an
existing inventory or from the risk of price increases in inventory yet to
be acquired.282 Hedgers are often large commercial firms that have

278. Paul S. Maco, Dir., Office of Mun. Sec., SEC, Remarks before the Joint Annual
Conference of the National Council of Health Facilities Authorities and the National Association
of Higher Education Facilities Authorities (Sept. 13, 2000).
279. Selective Disclosure & Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7887, Exchange Act
Release No. 42,259, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,209, 1999 WL 1217849 (proposed
Dec. 19, 2000).
280. Selective Disclosure & Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7881, Exchange Act
Release No. 43,154, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,599, 2000 WL 1201556 (Aug. 15,
2000).
281. Selective Disclosure & Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 7887, Exchange Act
Release No. 42,259, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,209, 1999 WL 1217849 (proposed
Dec. 19, 2000).
282. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 358 (1982)
(describing how hedging provides “well-recognized benefits” to commercial firms).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2020

41

Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 5 [2020], Art. 3

1250

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

nonpublic information concerning their own purchasing or selling plans
that may have a market effect.283
Despite such informational advantages, commodity futures traders
have not been saddled with the insider trading prohibition invented by the
SEC in Cady, Roberts. The Supreme Court rejected such an approach
over two hundred years ago in Laidlaw v. Organ.284 Writing for the Court
there, Chief Justice John Marshall held that a purchaser of tobacco had
no duty to disclose to the seller the buyer’s prior nonpublic knowledge of
the signing of the Treaty of Ghent.285 The public announcement of that
treaty subsequently caused a significant rise in tobacco prices.286
The CFTC has also heretofore rejected the SEC’s approach to insider
trading. Shortly after it was created, the CFTC conducted a study on
insider trading in the commodity markets. The resulting report found that,
like HFTs given privileged access to exchange market data: “[T]raders
on the floor of an exchange may have advantages of time and place over
others. Such access to superior or more timely information is inherent in
the markets, and futures market participants voluntarily accept this
situation if they choose to trade.”287
The CFTC noted in that report that, in one instance, the chief
economist for a large trading firm publicly announced “his forecast that
interest rates would fall.”288 That announcement had a strong market
effect on futures prices.289 Prior to the announcement, the economist’s
283. Hedge Fund Operational Due Diligence Education Series – Understanding Material
Nonpublic Information in the United States, CORGENTUM, https://www.corgentum.com/research/
hedge-fund-operational-due-diligence-material-nonpublic-information-united-states.html
[https://perma.cc/PH6F-NH8M]; Hedgers & Speculators, DANIELS TRADING, https://www.daniel
strading.com/education/futures-options-101/hedges-speculators [https://perma.cc/755N-EAMN].
284. 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 193 (1817).
285. Id. at 195.
286. Id. at 184–86, 193. In rejecting that claim, Justice Marshall’s opinion stated that:
The question in this case is, whether the intelligence of extrinsic circumstances,
which might influence the price of the commodity, and which was exclusively
within the knowledge of the vendee, ought to have been communicated by him
to the vendor? The court is of the opinion that he was not bound to communicate
it. It would be difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine within proper limits,
where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties. But at the
same time, each party must take care not to say or do anything tending to impose
upon the other.
Id. at 195.
287. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, A STUDY OF THE NATURE, EXTENT AND
EFFECTS OF FUTURES TRADING BY PERSONS POSSESSING MATERIAL, NONPUBLIC INFORMATION 54–
55 (1984).
288. Id. at 42.
289. Id. at 42–43.
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firm purchased several million dollars of futures contracts on financial
instruments that profited from the market effect of his prediction.290 In
the securities industry, such practices may be deemed a violation of
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.291 Nevertheless,
the CFTC’s insider trading report concluded that an inside trading
prohibition in the form of the classical theory adopted by the SEC was
unnecessary in the futures markets.292
Congress confirmed the CFTC’s approach to insider trading on
commodity futures exchanges when it amended the CEA in 2008. That
amendment added a proviso to the antifraud provisions of § 6b of the
CEA,293 which states that § 6b’s prohibitions do not require disclosure of
“nonpublic information that may be material to the market price, rate, or
level of the commodity or transaction, except as necessary to make any
statement made to the other person in or in connection with the
transaction not misleading in any material respect.”294
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010 (Dodd–Frank Act) added to the CEA language taken from
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This was the
statute that the SEC had used to create its insider trading prohibition.295
That language was borrowed to better prosecute price manipulation
schemes under the CEA.296 Congress made clear, however, that this
amendment did not create an insider trading prohibition under the CEA.
This was accomplished by adding the same language that was included
in the 2008 CEA amendments, which adopted the approach taken in the
Laidlaw case for insider trading in commodities.
The CFTC subsequently announced that it is permissible under the
Dodd–Frank amendment for traders “to withhold information that a
market participant lawfully possesses about market conditions . . . either

290. Id. at 43.
291. In Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979), the Court held that a financial
columnist could violate Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act by purchasing stock before
publishing an article that would cause a rise in the stock’s value and then selling the stock for a
profit, a practice known as “scalping.” Id. at 1267; see Bruce A. Kohn, Note, The First Amendment
and “Scalping” by a Financial Columnist: May a Newspaper Article Be Commercial Speech?,
57 IND. L.J. 131, 131 (1982); see also Feldman v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 679 F.2d 1299, 1304 (9th
Cir. 1982) (explaining the facts and significance of Zweig).
292. See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 287, at 59
293. 7 U.S.C. § 6b (2012).
294. Id. § 6b(b).
295. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
296. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 753, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1750 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. (2012)).
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in an anonymous market setting or in bilateral negotiations.”297 The
CFTC thus recognized “that unlike securities markets, derivatives
markets have long operated in a way that allows for market participants
to trade on the basis of lawfully obtained material nonpublic
information.”298
Despite these limitations on insider trading prohibitions, the CEA and
CFTC regulations prohibit exchange officials from trading on inside
information obtained in their roles as self-regulators.299 This raises the
issue of whether the exchange is “tipping” other traders, i.e., the
exchanges giving HFTs nonpublic information before other traders for
fees. In one case, the CFTC charged that an exchange was responsible for
the leaks of nonpublic information about the orders of other traders by an
employee to a third-party trader in exchange for entertainment
expenses.300 A district court refused to dismiss those charges.301
D. Insider Trading—Misappropriation and Front Running
Although Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is an antifraud
standard, it was never intended to be an all-purpose statute to attack fraud
everywhere for anything even remotely related to a security.302 Rather, it
is a term of art addressed to manipulative activities that affect securities
prices.303 Of course, as a commodity, proprietary material nonpublic
information should be protected from theft.304 However, theft was already
covered by the mail and wire fraud statutes before the new crime of
insider trading was invented under Section 10(b) of the Securities

297. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,402 (July 14,
2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180).
298. Id. at 41,403.
299. 7 U.S.C. § 13(e); 17 C.F.R. § 1.59(b)(1)(i) (2018).
300. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Byrnes, 58 F. Supp. 3d 319, 320–21
(S.D.N.Y. 2014).
301. Id. at 320.
302. See Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975) (noting how
the plaintiff must be the purchaser or seller of a security where fraud under Section 10b is
claimed).
303. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
304. Ironically, the SEC was itself subject to a massive misappropriation of material
nonpublic information from its confidential files. A group of hackers stole the information and
used it to make large profits by trading in stocks of companies filing financial reports with the
SEC before those reports were made publicly available. Dave Michaels & Gabriel T. Rubin, How
to Make Money Trading: Hack Into SEC, Peek at 157 Secret Earnings Reports, WALL ST. J. (Jan.
15, 2019, 7:40 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/overseas-trader-network-charged-withhacking-secs-corporate-filing-trove-11547562262 [https://perma.cc/LF2N-JDDE].
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Exchange Act.305 Nevertheless, the SEC’s misappropriation theory of
insider trading under Section 10(b) was recognized by the Supreme Court
in its O’Hagan decision.306
The CFTC initially rejected the adoption of a misappropriation theory.
In its 1984 report on inside trading in the futures markets, the CFTC
stated that:
[I]t is not always clear who is injured by such trading.
One of the parties injured by the misappropriation of
information, the source of the information, may not even
trade in the futures markets although that party’s cash market
positions could be affected indirectly. In addition, the party
transacting with the insider may claim harm by his or her
lack of access to the nonpublic information.307
“Front running” is a form of misappropriation.308 This practice
involves the use of advance knowledge of pending or proposed orders of
other traders that will have market effects and from which the front runner
can profit.309 The concern, in the context of privileged access to exchange
order-book data by HFTs, is that such access allows HFTs to trade in
front of other traders who do not have equal access. HFT algorithms can
also use order-book data to ferret out the trading patterns of other traders
and to profit from that knowledge.310 As one complaint alleged, preferred
access to exchange market data:
provided HFT firms with virtually exclusive access to
detailed trading data in time to “front-run” other market
participants by anticipating large pending transactions,
305. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987) (considering both mail and wire
fraud claims and misappropriation under Section 10b of the Securities Exchange Act).
306. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652–54 (1997).
307. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, supra note 287, at 57.
308. See, e.g., What Is Front Running?, CFI, https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/
resources/knowledge/trading-investing/front-running/ [https://perma.cc/R3XG-8WWN] (“Front
running is considered a form of market manipulation and insider trading because a person who
commits a front running activity expects security’s price movements based on the non-public
information.”); see also COVINGTON & BURLING, CFTC ENFORCEMENT OUTLOOK: INSIDER
TRADING 2–4 (2016), https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/publications/2016/10/cftc_
enforcement_outlook_insider_trading.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X45-UB6A] (discussing the
misappropriation theory and derivatives markets).
309. See City of Providence v. BATS Glob. Mkts., Inc., 878 F.3d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 2017)
(describing front running claims involving advanced access by HFTs to exchange market data),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 341 (2018).
310. See Shobbit Seth, The World of High Frequency Algorithmic Trading, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/091615/world-high-frequency-algorithmictrading.asp [https://perma.cc/J6FC-U563] (last updated May 19, 2019).
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buying and driving up the prices for the stocks before those
orders were placed, and forcing investors to pay more for
those stocks than they otherwise would have.311
The CFTC has, over the years, brought a handful of cases involving
front running of customer orders and there have been a couple of criminal
cases involving such claims.312 Front running claims have typically
involved a broker trading ahead of its own customers or employees
trading on market moving trading plans of their employer.313 HFTs are
not trading in front of their customers. Rather, they are trading in front
of, or taking advantage of, independent traders. As an SEC Commissioner
has noted, “[t]he HFT firm ‘has no preexisting relationship with the trader
placing the order that the HFT detects,’ which means that the HFT firm
is not breaking any duty to the other trader.”314 Of course, the same is true
of classical insider trading where the person buying from, or selling to,
the insider generally has no preexisting relationship with the insider.
Although the CFTC was prohibited from adopting a classical theory
of insider trading by Dodd–Frank and earlier 2008 legislation,315 it
continued to press for a front running prohibition in Rule 180.1, adopted
after Dodd–Frank.316 In adopting the rule, the CFTC stated that Rule
180.1 may prohibit “trading on the basis of material nonpublic
information in breach of a pre-existing duty (established by another law
or rule, agreement, understanding, or some other source).”317 It also
prohibited trading on the basis of “material nonpublic information that
was obtained through fraud or deception.”318 This seems to adopt a
311. BATS Glob. Mkts., 878 F.3d at 49.
312. See generally United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding mail and
wire fraud convictions where brokers breached fiduciary duty to customers by trading ahead of
their orders); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Kelly, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 27,465
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (entering a CFTC injunctive action with a criminal prosecution for front running
employer’s orders); In re Ruggles, CFTC No. 16-34, [2016–2017 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut.
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 33,872 (Sept. 29, 2016) (entering a consent order for front running); In re
Motazedi, CFTC No. 16-02, [2015–2016 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 33,599
(Dec. 2, 2015) (entering a consent order for front running).
313. See, e.g., Dial, 757 F.2d at 168.
314. Peirce, supra note 13, at 350 (quoting Merritt B. Fox et al., The New Stock Market;
Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191, 227 (2015)).
315. See supra notes 293–97 and accompanying text.
316. 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2018).
317. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,430 (July 14,
2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180); see Andrew Verstein, Insider Trading in Commodities
Markets, 102 VA. L. REV. 447, 464–65 (2016) (discussing this rule and conducting a comparative
analysis of insider trading prohibitions in the securities and commodities markets).
318. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,403.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol71/iss5/3

46

Markham: Regulating the Sale of Stock Exchange Market Data to High-Frequen

2019]

REGULATING THE SALE OF STOCK EXCHANGE MARKET DATA

1255

misappropriation theory for insider trading in the futures markets despite
the rejection of such a prohibition in the agency’s 1984 insider trading
report.319
The CFTC seems poised to expand its enforcement of Rule 180.1. In
2018, the CFTC created a new “Insider Trading and Information
Protection Task Force,” which will prosecute misappropriation of
confidential information, front running, and unauthorized disclosures of
information about customer trading.320 The reference to “Insider
Trading” in the title of this task force suggests that the CFTC is seeking
to gain some of the spotlight obtained by the SEC in the press through the
invention of the crime of insider trading. Whatever the case, it is unlikely
that the CFTC will claim that the privileged data fee arrangements for
HFTs will constitute front running or misappropriation of customer
information. To do so would expand insider trading prohibitions even
beyond the SEC’s positions on the subject.
V. EXCHANGE MARKET DATA FEES SHOULD NOT BE REGULATED
The SEC’s law against insider trading suffers from the fact that the
agency administratively created this crime on the premise that unequal
access to information is unfair to other traders. As a result, prohibited
insider trading has no real definition beyond what the SEC or a court may
say it is on any given day. Claims brought by traders against exchanges
giving HFTs unequal access to market data are premised on this
unfairness theory wrapped in the cloak of fiduciary duties. The SEC
resisted applying insider trading prohibitions to the sale of this data, but
has reversed course on deferring to market forces to regulate associated
fees.321 This seems to signal an effort to continue to regulate such fees
through public utility-like proceedings. The SEC’s announcement of its
pilot program to measure the effects of transaction fees on market
efficiency322 will undoubtedly raise the unfairness issue, i.e., the SEC will
be asked to regulate exchange fees and rebates in ways that will reduce
this “unfairness” to other traders.
Critics of HFTs having privileged access to market data, particularly
non-core data, will continue to attack tiered fees for that data on the
ground that it allows HFTs to front run the orders of other traders. The
CFTC’s new “Insider Trading and Information Protection Task Force”
will also be tempted and pressured to create novel theories that will attack
319. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
320. Katherine Berk, The CFTC Pushes into New Insider Trading Terrain, COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. ONLINE (Nov. 27, 2018, 10:59 AM), https://cblr.columbia.edu/the-cftc-pushes-into-newinsider-trading-terrain/ [https://perma.cc/PGM7-N49R].
321. See supra Section IV.C.
322. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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the HFTs’ order detection algorithms, which rely on privileged market
data access as a form of front running.
Hopefully, the SEC and CFTC will resist efforts to subject exchange
market data fees to the “unfairness” theory on which insider trading
prohibitions are premised. Exchange market data is simply a commodity
that has value to its proprietor, i.e., the exchange. As a commodity,
information has value that, when brought to market, should reward the
person possessing and transmitting it to market faster than other traders
through a better price received for order executions. This is not a onesided bargain. The rapid introduction of new information by traders
motivated to bring the information to market creates market efficiency
benefits.
Nonpublic information has been used to gain profits in the commodity
markets for over two centuries, as illustrated by the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Laidlaw v. Organ.323 The SEC should
acknowledge what the Supreme Court recognized in Laidlaw: There
should be no duty imposed to assure that counterparties have access to
nonpublic information.324 That is the rule in the futures markets. In other
words, unequal access to information is not unfair. Rather, trading on
such information assures faster, more efficient pricing because the
possessor will have a profit incentive to bring this information to the
market. Prices will respond to the signals emitted by the trader buying or
selling on the basis of the nonpublic information. Market efficiency
outweighs concerns with unfairness to other traders in the commodity
markets, and that should be the case for the securities markets.
This is not a radical concept. Commodities may be marketed in a
variety of ways that provide differing levels of access or service to
purchasers of commodities. For example, Amazon offers premium
delivery services for a fee.325 Information, in particular, is often sold at
prices that vary based on the speed and nature of the access being sold.
Look no further than your most recent hotel stay, where you may have
been given the choice of free Internet, which is slow, or faster Internet for
a fee.326 Cable television subscribers are also provided varying levels of

323. See 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 184–86 (1817).
324. See id. at 195.
325. Explore Business Prime Benefits, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/businessprime
?hvptwo=&hvnetw=g&hvadid=275306224776&hvpone=&ref=pd_sl_22g97rcr8p_e&force-fullsite=1&_encoding=UTF8&hvpos=1t1&hvdev=c&hvexid=&hvqmt=e&tag=googhydr-20&hvta
rgid=kwd-10567466461&hvrand=8486212107081986006 [https://perma.cc/WD4M-KCQL].
326. See, e.g., Member Benefits, HILTON, https://hiltonhonors3.hilton.com/en/explore/
benefits/index.html [https://perma.cc/B43B-SRGY] (offering free wi-fi to persons frequently
staying at a Hilton hotel).
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service and are charged based on the information content and level they
want to access.327
The SEC has modified its approach to inside information with respect
to non-core market data fees by allowing privileged access to be sold to
a select group of traders, i.e., HFTs. Nevertheless, its penchant for
regulating the flow of information in the securities markets continues.
Initially, the SEC deferred to exchange competition to regulate the
amounts of fees for non-core market data.328 This meant that non-core
market data could be sold to the highest bidders, viz., the HFTs. The
HFTs, however, contend that the exchanges are overcharging for this
information and have appealed to the SEC to regulate the amounts of
those fees. As described above, the SEC’s hands-off approach to
exchange fees was successfully challenged in a circuit court, which found
that the SEC’s economic approach to the fairness of the fees lacked
rigorous application.329 Afterwards, and as a result of provisions in the
Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, the SEC began taking a more proactive
approach in finding exchange fees to be excessive.330
In the meantime, traders suffering from the privileged access to noncore data sold to HFTs are claiming that this access is unfair and have
made fraud and other claims challenging this access.331 The courts are
still sorting out the validity of such claims. Whatever the outcome of
future challenges to the SEC’s utility-like regulation over exchange
market data fees, issues and claims of unfairness will continue. The
ultimate question that needs to be answered is simply whether exchanges
should make available such material nonpublic information for sale to the
highest bidder. That question has been addressed and answered by
Congress in the commodity futures markets, where the CEA rejected
unfairness claims relating to unequal access to nonpublic information.
The CFTC has been precluded by statute from restricting trading on
inside information even if that information may have a market effect on
commodity futures prices.332
On the other side of the coin, public utility-like regulation should not
protect HFTs from high fees. If the fees are too high, the HFTs can exit
327. See, e.g., Xfinity Subscription Packages, COMCAST, https://www.xfinity.com/
learn/digital-cable-tv/svod [https://perma.cc/AQ49-4P79] (describing several subscription ondemand packages).
328. See supra Section IV.C.
329. See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
330. See Morgenson, supra note 6.
331. See supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text. See generally Chi. Bd. Options Exch.
v. SEC, 889 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2018) (affirming a decision by the SEC in which the court deferred
to the SEC’s conclusion that the agency did not have jurisdiction to hear claims by broker–dealers
seeking an accounting and damages from exchanges charging improper fees).
332. Pub. L. No. 74-675, 49 Stat. 1491 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–27(f) (2012)).
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the market and seek or create alternative trading venues or seek protection
under the antitrust laws if the exchanges exercise their monopoly power
improperly. That ability gives large institutional traders tremendous
bargaining power. As it is now, the HFTs are gaming the exchanges by
using the SEC as their tool to reduce exchange fees. Apparently frustrated
by that delayed process, HFTs are formulating competitive threats to the
exchanges that seek a reduction in fees. As noted above, that effort
includes the creation of competing exchanges.333 That competition should
be allowed to proceed. It will provide a real market test for keeping
market data fees reasonable through competition.
CONCLUSION
The SEC’s development of the NMS was premised on the ability of
stockbrokers to readily access core data to fulfill their NMS customer
order execution responsibilities. The SEC initially deferred to the market
in setting the levels for those fees, i.e., the agency allowed competition
among exchanges and other trading venues for volume to assure that high
fees did not effectively bar brokers’ access to that data. The SEC has now
reversed that approach, holding that the exchanges have not shown that
market forces were adequate to assure fair and reasonable fees. In taking
this action, the SEC is trying to act as a referee in the fight over data fees
between SIFMA members and the stock exchanges. In carrying out this
role, the SEC has switched from one side to the other without any real
economic support for its positions. At the same time, the SEC has left the
investing public to the tender mercies of the HFTs in their preferred
access to non-core data. The effect of this two-tiered approach is that the
SEC is fostering an unlevel playing field on dubious policy grounds.
333. See supra notes 52, 166 and accompanying text. An existing exchange is also competing
on fees and to operate its systems in a way that lessens the trading advantages of HFTs. See
Morgenson, supra note 6; see also Cezary Podkul, Study Finds ‘Speed Bumps’ Help Protect
Ordinary Investors, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/studyfinds-speed-bumps-help-protect-ordinary-investors-1528974002 [https://perma.cc/UUC3-L98S]
(describing IEX’s effort to equalize market access for all traders). The SEC also approved a pilot
program by an exchange that slows down order entry (speed bump) to remove or reduce latency
advantages of HFTs. Chi. Stock Exch., Pilot Program Approved for LEAD Speed Bump, MEDIUM
(Oct. 20, 2017), https://medium.com/@TradeOnCHX/pilot-program-approved-for-lead-speedbump-9954c01a2926 [https://perma.cc/8Z88-SLS3]; see also Markham, supra note 15, at 612–
13 (describing other efforts to slow the HFTs’ ability to formulate and enter orders faster than
other traders). Competition with exchange fees is also arriving from “single dealer” based
exchanges in which a large financial institution acts as the counterparty to clients that are buying
and selling stocks. Alexander Osipovich, After Job Cuts, Deutsche Bank Plans New Electronic
Stock-Trading Venture, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/after-job-cutsdeutsche-bank-plans-new-electronic-stock-trading-venture-11553802022 [https://perma.cc/3QW4J8ME].
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The SEC could, of course, double down and start regulating non-core
data fees and exchange rebates.334 This would lessen the disparity of
access to the extent that smaller traders may be better able to afford
reduced fees for this data. This access would not, however, remove the
speed advantage of the HFTs’ computerized algorithmic trading and their
use of high-speed lines and other modern communication advances.
Moreover, the large financial institutions that SIFMA represents do not
need the SEC’s assistance in bargaining for lower fees. The SEC is, in
any event, ill-equipped for its role of setting fees for market data. That
public-utility style regulation should be abandoned in favor of the forces
of market competition. This competition is now arriving in the guise of
new exchanges that are forming to challenge data fees. In the meantime,
if the current exchanges are using their monopoly power to exact
unreasonable fees, the antitrust laws will provide adequate protection,
especially if the securities laws are deemed not to impliedly repeal those
statutes.

334. In March 2019, the SEC announced that it was reviewing the multi-tier pricing and
rebate programs now used by the exchanges. The SEC study will seek to determine whether those
arrangements are placing smaller traders at an unfair advantage. John McCrank, Exclusive: SEC
Scrutinizes Fairness of Exchange Pricing, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2019, 1:43 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-exchanges-fees-exclusive/exclusive-sec-scrutinizes-fair
ness-of-stock-exchange-pricing-idUSKCN1QO2CY [https://perma.cc/B6YR-WJE3]. The SEC
chairman also revealed that the agency would be seeking to speed up dissemination of core data
as a means for reducing the disparity of access to market data. Gabriel T. Rubin & Alexander
Osipovich, SEC Chief Wants Smaller Investors to Have Better, Faster Stock Data, WALL ST. J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-chief-wants-smaller-investors-to-have-better-faster-stockdata-11552052700 [https://perma.cc/UJ6L-YLLV] (last updated Mar. 8, 2019, 2:03 PM).
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